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ABSTRACT 
The rise of International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOS) in the post-Cold 
War era in Africa exerted pressure on conflict resolution mechanisms as governments 
responded to perceived and real pressure from external, mainly Western countries. 
INGOs are well resourced and conduct ‘humanitarian’ and other work funded by 
donors. The issue of funding is critical to control and legitimacy. It is also tied to 
achievement of intended goals. The study explores the relationships and in some 
cases conflict between Western NGOs in Zimbabwe and the government during the 
period when the latter was experiencing diplomatic estrangement with Western 
countries. The qualitative study seeks to establish whether INGO operations were 
influenced by political relations. The researcher interviewed twenty experts in NGO 
and governmental operations using an interview guide. Data was collected and 
entered into Nvivo software where it was thematically analysed. The major findings of 
the study are that the political strand is the main relational context that determined the 
relationship between the government and INGOs. INGOs were viewed as active 
conflict drivers mostly due to the bias towards certain political parties and being 
conduits of Western initiatives. Local conflict resolution mechanisms were also 
established to be inadequate. The study recommends that the government of 
Zimbabwe needs to work on maladministration and resolve differences with Western 
countries. Local NGOs and INGOs should not meddle in politics in order to have a 
trustworthy relationship with government while donor funds are more appreciated 
when channelled through governments. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Zimbabwean economic, social and political sphere has been characterized by 
tensions, shortages and crises since 1998. Various explanations of this have been 
proffered but many scholars agree that the causes date back to the inconclusive 
resolution of the land issue of the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement. Also coinciding 
with the Zimbabwean crisis build up was the demise of the Soviet Union in 1989, which 
witnessed the ushering in of a new global outfit - the unipolar era characterised by 
democratisation and liberalization. The international arena saw the growth of vehicles 
of this new ideology, the non-state actors in world politics, one of which was Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs). 
Numerous NGOs worked in various fields, from humanitarian, development, 
governance to conflict management. They were well resourced and had the capacity 
to influence and lobby governments for the adoption of certain policies. They 
influenced or limited space for decision makers, particularly in developing countries. 
Zimbabwe witnessed the influx of a plethora of NGOs operating in various fields in the 
period around year 1998-9, although not much was achieved in averting the tension 
and conflict that characterized the economic, social and political atmosphere. This 
Chapter will discuss the background to the Zimbabwean situation, the rationale for the 
study, statement of the problem, the objectives, research questions and the rest of the 
outline of the study. 
1.2 BACKGROUND 
The 1980 Zimbabwe independence from the British colonial rule was a product of a 
liberation struggle which culminated in the Lancaster House Constitution. The 
liberation struggle was launched with the support of the eastern bloc under the 
communist ideology. The liberation party, Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic 
Front (ZANU PF) inculcated values and expectations in the masses that were modeled 
along the communist thinking and could be satisfied through a command economy. 
These ideals, however, had developed a political culture and expectations in both the 
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masses and the party structure which were abandoned with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union before achieving deliverables. The communist thinking was not compatible with 
the western liberalization concept pushed by NGOs.  
While the unipolar era witnessed a decline in interstate conflict and a rise in intra state 
conflict, scholars such as Azar (1991), Galtung (1990) and Bradshaw (2008) ascribe 
that correlation to groups’ empowerment where individual groups began to seek higher 
order needs. This study explored the relationship between the rise of intra-state 
conflict and the proliferation of NGOs after the fall of the Berlin Wall, with the specific 
focus on Zimbabwe. 
Despite having coined its governmental ideology along the communist perspectives, 
the Zimbabwean government adjusted its orientation to meet the new global dictates 
of capital economy after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1992, Zimbabwe adopted 
the Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes which saw the erosion of 
government subsidies on health and education. It witnessed the privatization of many 
state owned industries and the decay of the newly expanded social service delivery 
systems after the government had focused its attention to the creation of an ‘enabling 
environment’ leaving the provision of social services to the market forces (Manji and 
O’Coill 2002: 2). 
This process witnessed the government abdicating its sovereignty as the gap was 
quickly filled in by various groups wielding technical expertise but lacking 
accountability to local authorities or citizens. The government failed to honour the 
social contract with its citizenry leading to widespread discontentment. Coincidentally, 
the 1990s world focus turned to ‘good governance, the minimalist state and political 
pluralism’ In the midst of this discontentment was the ever-growing force, the NGOs, 
who “proffered solutions” to the public but did not mitigate the conflict that was 
spreading to all sectors. The puzzle then is, if they “filled in the void” of the provision 
of social services, why did the government experience perpetual conflict with its 
citizenry over the same issues (Ibid). In a study conducted by Jenny Soderstrom in 
2008 in Georgia on NGOs working with grassroots on conflict resolution, 34 
participants were interviewed from 7 organisations and the results indicated that there 
was a causal relationship between NGO strategies and ripple effects of their 
educational programmes. In Zimbabwe, NGO civic education resulted in rebellious 
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attitudes towards governmental approaches setting an atmosphere of conflict. For 
example, National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), Zimbabwe Election Support 
Network (ZESN) and Crisis Coalition conducted programmes that caused ripple 
effects of resentment of governmental policies. This research focuses on international 
NGOs operating in Zimbabwe as well as externally funded local NGOs working in 
governance, public policy formulation, human rights and electoral issues. 
1.3 RATIONALE 
International NGOs deal with ‘as much as 60% of all humanitarian effort and as much 
as half of what goes through the UN system’ (Brown et al 2007:59). Collingwood 
(2000:442) states that NGOs have not only multiplied in terms of numbers and 
territorial influence but in activities and influence as well. They have become ‘larger, 
more visible, better organized and more sophisticated in its relations with political 
institutions and the media’ raising debate about the legitimacy of their participation in 
governance matters. (Ibid: 442). The New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD)‘s main objective was the co-ordination of developmental programmes for 
African Union (AU) members yet one of their major drawbacks was the donor 
community’s, the G8 in particular, creations of unrealistic and impossible political 
expectations (Cilliers 2002:1). The land issue in Zimbabwe became the litmus test of 
some of NEPAD’s objectives and principles when the body was divided over donor 
interference.  
Most conflict management and resolution efforts in Africa are funded by foreign 
agencies and states, and Zimbabwe is no exception. UN agencies and other 
international organizations such as Amnesty International, and Oxfam (most of whom 
originate in Western countries), provide, among other things, crucial assistance in the 
management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. Jean-Pierre Cot (1972) emphasizes 
the importance of considering internal and international ‘situations’ of states involved 
in conflict. Mary Kaldor (quoted in Miall et al 2000:69) notes that the conduct of the 
intrastate wars differ considerably from interstate wars and lists external support as 
one of the major tenets that drive these conflicts.  Ultimately, the rise of these powerful 
non-state actors produced a negative impact on the African ability to deal with conflicts 
(Boege et al 2009, quoted in Schwarzenbach 2011:2).  
4 
In Zimbabwe, there has been a lot of public debate about whether international NGO 
conflict management assistance and programmes are progressive or not but little or 
no research has been done to ascertain the correct position. This exploratory research 
seeks to unpack the discourse and contribute towards empirical establishment of the 
role of NGOs in conflict management, with the specific focus on Zimbabwe. 
1.4 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The acceptance of NGOs as actors in the social, political and economic realm by the 
UN, World Bank and other international and regional bodies increased the number of 
parties who participate in conflict management. Pruitt and Kim (2004:89) observed that 
increasing parties to a conflict causes proliferation of the issue as each party brings 
its own interests to the table resulting in complication and conflict escalation. In 
Zimbabwe, the case in focus of this study, advocacy NGOs over the years fought for 
different reforms of different values and this often complicated the conflict resolution 
processes. 
NGOs working for public good need to work in harmony with the government to avoid 
proliferation of issues and alienation. Clark (1991:1) notes that in countries where 
international NGOs play oppositional rather than operational roles, governments are 
highly suspicious of their work. This was the case in Zimbabwe where suspicions and 
mistrust characterized relations between government and NGOs while the latter 
worked well with opposition political parties. They advocated for liberalization and 
government argued that they heightened the conflict by trying to inculcate values that 
were not compatible with their domestic norms and capabilities. The government of 
Zimbabwe complained that there was interference in their domestic affairs from 
western countries that was being propagated by NGOs.  
The UN model of Track Two Diplomacy was premised on the idea of ‘non-profit, non-
political and independent entities…’ (Lewis,1990) yet the independence of many 
NGOs was compromised by donors whose interests determined the programmes to 
be undertaken rather than the needs of the recipients. This transformed the NGO into 
a tool for the pursuance of goals that could not be achieved by the traditional diplomatic 
tool. Manji (2002: ix) observes that due to the objective outlook of NGOs, little attention 
has been paid to their subjective intentions. In announcing the background to the need 
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for the 2004 NGO Bill, the government of Zimbabwe reiterated the observation by 
Antonio Gramsci quoted in Hearn (2001:43) that civil ‘society is a potential 
battleground’ providing powerful states with a platform to influence the political 
agendas of developing states. This research seeks to explore the role of NGOs in 
Zimbabwe, examining whether or not international NGOs negatively influenced the 
conflict management systems. 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 What is the role of international NGOs in the political and social conflicts in 
Zimbabwe?  
 Do the international NGOs complement or clash with governmental 
programmes in Zimbabwe? 
 Are campaigns and activities by international NGOs that call for profound socio-
economic and political changes improving the situation in Zimbabwe or leading 
to further disputes and conflicts? 
1.6 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
1.6.1 Aims 
The aims of this study are to; 
1) Establish whether international NGOs influence conflict management and 
resolution processes in Zimbabwe. 
2) Establish whether the NGOs work to fulfill the interests of the governments of their 
countries of origin or their donors, or work in the best interest of the people of 
Zimbabwe. 
3) Establish whether NGOs limit local conflict management options in Zimbabwe. 
1.6.2 Objectives 
The objectives of the study are as follows; 
 Explore the role played by NGOs in conflict management and resolution in 
Zimbabwe. 
 Recommend the way forward for future involvement of international NGOs in 
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Africa’s conflict management processes. 
1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This research will enable government policy makers to have an empirical 
understanding of the effects of NGO programmes in Zimbabwe. It will help shade light 
on the current suspicions and mistrust that exist between government and NGOs. 
Similarly, NGOs will benefit by getting a clearer picture of how their programmes are 
seen by people and government officials in Zimbabwe.  
Since the study is explorative, it will excite possible further research on the matter 
while contributing to the existing knowledge gap. The research could also be 
generalised on other developing countries in similar situations and conflict 
practitioners will gain insight in understanding the dynamics of the conflict 
environment. 
1.8 DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The study was conducted in Harare, Zimbabwe, where most international NGOs 
operating in the country house their Head Offices. Some of them are local NGOs that 
receive foreign funding and direction for their programmes. The focus of the study was 
on international NGOs as well as local NGOs that received foreign funding. Data about 
NGOs was collected from those operating in humanitarian work, governance and 
human rights programmes receiving foreign funding. 
The period under study is between year 2000 and 2010. The period is specifically 
chosen because that is when Zimbabwe soured its relationship with Western countries 
and many international NGOs in the field of political governance and human rights 
intensified their operations in the country. It is also the same period when 
discontentment had risen due to socio-economic and political tensions. NGO activities 
increased and remained at the core of the conflict issues.  
1.8.2 Sample size and procedure 
The study used non-probability sampling techniques; purposive sampling as well as 
snowball sampling. This was done to ensure that participants to the study are people 
who have the relevant expertise and experience. Twenty participants were interviewed 
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in-depth using a questionnaire guide and these were drawn from targeted institutions 
or were recommended by other participants in the study. Additional data was also 
collected from the available literature. 
1.9 LIMITATIONS 
This study focused on a recent and on-going conflicts and as such encountered 
limitations in obtaining academic literature. However, the researcher incorporated the 
use of media reports, newsletters and publications while maintaining guard to possible 
bias. Similarly, due to the currency of the matter, there was sensitivity in some of the 
answers sought. The researcher resolved sensitivity by guaranteeing confidentiality 
and applying emotional intelligence in the questioning techniques during data 
collection.  
1.10 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
For purposes of this study, the following terms are defined and or are to be understood 
as follows: 
NGOs 
Non-Governmental Organisations - The World Bank (2002) defines NGOs as “private 
organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the 
poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community 
development.” The contemporary UN definition (Lewis 199:2) of an NGO is a non-
profit entity, non-criminal and not a political party. In Zimbabwe, the terms ‘NGO’ and 
Civil Society Organisations (CSO), have been used interchangeably. They work 
closely with communities and are members of the national umbrella body, National 
Association for Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO). The registration process 
and laws governing the operating framework are the same. This study will refer to 
CSOs as NGOs.  
Government 
In this study, government refers to the political administration of the country which is 
constituted by the party that wins an election. 
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Conflict 
Coser (1956) in Burton and Dukes (1990:5) defined conflict as a “struggle over values 
and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents 
are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals while Rhoodie (1991:21) contended 
that conflict normally occurs where groups of people compete for scarce resources 
.Pruitt and Rubbin (1986) noted that the divergence of interest, whether real or 
perceived, where parties would struggle to prevail over each other because their 
interests were not compatible was a key element for conflict to take place. In this study, 
conflict is traced in the divergence of views amongst Zimbabwean communities and 
their government. 
Conflict is about struggles to prevail over the opposition and it does not necessarily 
need violence to machinate. Galtung (1979) identified conflict as being composed of 
two main sections - latent (hidden) and (manifest) conflict, with the two forms being 
important to the understanding of any conflict situation. 
Conflict management 
Conflict management is the process of handling conflict ensuring that it does not 
escalate while exploring means for possible resolution. Bradshaw (2008) describes 
conflict management as the processes undertaken by an entity to resolve or mediate 
a conflict situation. 
Crisis 
Snyder and Diesing (1977:3) contend that crises lie in between war and peace and 
are characterized by a shortness of decision making time and a sense of urgency. 
While ‘wars are preceded by a crisis of some sort, not all crises eventuate in war’ 
(1977:10). The behaviour of conflicting parties in a crisis present a mixed blend of 
coercion and compromise. Zimbabwe has been known to have encountered a crisis 
in the period under study. Economic, legal and political decisions were made under 
crisis circumstances. 
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1.11 LAYOUT OF THE STUDY 
The treatise is organised as follows: Chapter One introduces the background and 
reasons for the study before giving the research problem and questions. It then states 
the aims and the expected impact of the study after which the delimitation and 
limitation of the study are spelt out. Chapter Two discusses the literature on the role 
of international NGOs in conflict management in developing countries by examining 
the circumstances under which NGOs participate in conflict. It provides the theoretical 
frameworkthat guides the study as well as the empirical literature. Chapter Three 
discusses the literature on the alleged NGO influence on conflict management 
systems. Chapter Four details the methodology used in this study. The findings are 
discussed in Chapter Five while Chapter Six outlines recommendations from the 
study. 
1.12 CONCLUSION 
The Chapter gave a brief background to the study highlighting the involvement of 
NGOs in conflict. It also discussed the importance of the study in providing an 
alternative approach to understanding the role of NGOs in conflict management in 
Zimbabwe. The rationale that necessitated the study, research problem and questions 
were also discussed. Parameters of the research were also spelt out in this Chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this Chapter the researcher discusses the systems within which NGOs and 
governments interact either directly or indirectly ‘competing’ for the communities’ 
support. The Chapter reviews existing literature seeking to understand the 
circumstances in which NGOs play an influential role in conflict dynamics in developing 
countries. The discussion states the theoretical underpinnings of the study before 
dwelling on the empirical literature focusing on the effects of globalisation on the state 
and NGOs. The funding of NGOs has been argued to be the pertinent issue that 
compromises their independence. The Chapter also discusses in comparison the 
controversial operations of NGOs as well as the glorified programmes of NGOs while 
epitomizing its contribution to the existing literature. The Chapter ends with a summary 
of these findings. 
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Conflict management is a multidiscipline phenomenon that has been studied using 
approaches from various social science perspectives. These approaches comprise of 
two broad categories, that is, macro and micro depending on the unit of analysis. Thus 
conflict analysis has dimensions varying from the personal, interpersonal, group, 
national or international levels individual, presenting different theoretical explanations 
for the conflict processes. These include psychological, biological, sociological, 
historical and world politics explanations among others. This study explores the role 
of international NGOs in influencing conflict management systems in Zimbabwe and 
is thus informed by the macro theories of conflict management discourse. 
The study will be informed by the structural theory of imperialism as espoused by 
Johan Galtung, the basic human needs theory advanced by John Burton and Edward 
Ezar, the dependency theory and the realist theory of international relations. These 
theories will be articulated in analyzing the existing literature to explore whether 
international NGOs influenced the conflict management systems in Zimbabwe. 
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2.2.1 Structural theory of imperialism 
In the post-colonial period, Zimbabwe, like many other African states, experienced a 
new form of domination in the form of imperialism, in which powerful states controlled 
and influenced less developed ones through indoctrination and the creation of value 
systems that marginalized the underdeveloped (Galtung 1971,Bradshaw 2008). The 
use of military might that characterized the colonial era was replaced by the 
construction of fraudulent systems that were embedded in international structures. 
Galtung who espoused the theory of structural imperialism envisaged the existence of 
centre nations and periphery nations who had an ‘unequal relationship for the benefit 
of the centre at the expense of the periphery’ (Ghosh 2009:39). The relationship 
thrives on the ability of the centre to exploit (through structures that were designed for 
that) and capacity to divide the periphery. Galtung(in Ghosh 2009:40) asserts that 
imperialism does not need force but is ‘based on structural rather than direct 
violence’’(ibid).Adam Smith (1976) who is one of the earliest proponents of capitalism 
predicted that hidden forces would come to the fore to pursue self-interest and NGOs 
have been argued to be the hidden hands predicted by Smith. Later scholars, (Manji 
2007, Shiviji 2005) have labelled NGOs as vehicles for the perpetration of foreign 
policies of the powerful states on the weaker states. Galtung builds on the Marxist–
Leninist theory which understood imperialism only in economic terms –‘private 
capitalism, motivated by the need for expanding markets’- but also traces imperialism 
in political and cultural spheres (Galtung 1971:2).  
2.2.2 Basic human needs theory 
John Burton (1979) refined Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs to become 
usable in the conflict theory discourse.  Basic human needs theory content that there 
are universal basic human needs that are to be satisfied to prevent or resolve conflict. 
In a major departure from Maslow’s theory, these needs do not necessarily form a 
hierarchy and are pursued simultaneously (Burton 1990a and 1997, Bradshaw 2008). 
Pararells can be drawn between human needs theory and the frustration aggression 
psychological approach to conflict advanced by Dollard. Frustration aggression theory 
argues that when human beings are denied basic needs, they are plunged in a state 
that prepares them for violent conflict. Human needs theory contends that when man 
are denied basic needs they will engage in social conflict and needs conflicts are often 
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deep rooted and violent (Bradshaw 2008). 
Human needs theory makes an immense contribution to conflict analysis and the 
resolution process particularly on the approach to negotiation where it departs from 
the traditional negotiation style that creates winner and losers. The theory advances a 
notion that seeks a distinction between interest based conflicts which Burton terms 
‘disputes’’ and needs based conflicts which are non-negotiable (demands have to be 
met).The table below highlights major conflict theorists and their submissions on the 
role of human needs on conflict. 
Table 1: Human Needs, as presented by various theorists 
Maslow Burton Rosenberg Max Neef8 
Food, water, shelter (1) Distributive 
justice  
Physical 
Nurturance  
Subsistence 
Safety and security (2)  Safety, Security  Interdependence  Protection 
Belonging or love (3)  Belongingness, 
Love  
Integrity  Affection 
Self-esteem (4)  Self-esteem  Autonomy  Understanding 
Personal fulfilment (5)  Personal 
fulfilment 
Play  Creation 
 Identity  Celebration and 
Identity 
mourning 
 Cultural security  Spiritual 
Communion 
Leisure, 
Idleness 
 Freedom  Freedom 
 Participation  Participation  
The UN () recognises the right to self-determination in a spirit that embraces the 
human needs theory. NGO operations focus on people’s needs and the theory is thus 
critical to the study. Advocacy NGOs identify identity, freedom and human rights needs 
and they conduct awareness programmes to generate platforms responsible for 
seeking redress. In Zimbabwe mainly civil society groups fall in this category and have 
been in constant conflict with governmental structures. On the other hand, the 
government’s land redistribution programme (which arguably lies at the core of the 
conflict)is based on the peoples need for land, identity and economic freedom. The 
government envisages that by satisfying human needs and attaining economic 
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freedom, the country will move away from dependency on developed nations. 
2.2.3 Dependency theory 
The siphoning of resources from less developed to the developed and industrialised 
countries at the expense of the less developed states has been the basis for the 
formulation of the dependency theory. Dependency theory was developed in the 
1950s in a bid to explain how capitalism tied the development of northern countries to 
underdevelopment of the southern countries. Andre Gunder Frank (1966) is one of the 
pioneering scholars of the theory who argued that some states had their development 
options prescribed to them by structural systems determined by stronger and powerful 
states in a process where they had no input. The theory holds that the world is divided 
into two subgroups; dependent states comprising of Africa, Latin America and Asia 
while the satellite group was composed of developed and industrialised nations of the 
Organisation of Economic Coorperation and Development (OECD). 
In examining the impact of a clash of two societies that are at different stages of 
development, Walter Rodney’s (1973:20) theory of underdevelopment postulated that 
the less developed suffers, adding that the severity is determined by the degree of 
difference of development. The developing countries are exposed to the market forces 
in which they are not able to compete and are thus forced into dependency to survive 
in the global village. International NGO operations reinforce the position by further 
promoting conditions (through liberalisation) that will weaken national cohesion. While 
NGOs are a third sector, they have devoted more attention to governments than they 
have to business, thus instead of harnessing industrial growth, they concentrate on 
political development. The separation of political development and industrial 
development in Africa cause fissures that lead to the type of conflict experienced in 
Zimbabwe.  
2.2.4 Realist theory of international relations 
Hans Morgenthau (1948) is one of the major scholars who contributed towards the 
development of the realist theory of international relations which postulates that states 
are the supreme actors in world politics and that all actions undertaken by states are 
driven by interests. It envisages a world where international actors are postulated in 
Lorenz and Hobbes views of man being in a constant posture for war, waiting for an 
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opportunity to strike. Though widely criticized for being state centric, the realist theory 
has remained a dominant and relevant to critical understanding of conflict theory with 
Hans Morgenthau’s view of politics as ‘a struggle for power’ being a major referent 
point in international relations studies. 
States are viewed as self-centred entities which are desirous to expand and will only 
fail to do so if they meet an opposing force, even then they have an alternative to 
pursue. NGOs act as an alternative route for states to pursue their foreign policies and 
realize possible ‘’expansion’’ in the form of hidden control. This study explores the role 
played by international NGOs on conflict management systems in Zimbabwe, that is, 
whether they act independent of their governments and whether they exert pressure 
on Zimbabwe’s conflict management systems by advancing their interests. The study 
seeks to establish whether NGOs maintained independency from political control from 
their countries of origin and managed to be what they ought to be. 
2.3 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
International NGOs rely on donor funding and as such they are either subject or 
responsive to global political and market forces. CSOs are often referred to as NGOs, 
operate on the basis of altruism (mostly in developing countries) and also rely on 
donors, usually from the same source. In some sources, the terms ‘NGO’ and ‘CSO’ 
are used interchangeably. Howell and Pearce (2000:76) observe that NGOs are an 
important tool for democratization and the creation of a world capital economy. They 
say that ‘in legitimizing civil-society strengthening programs, donors make frequent 
reference to the potential of civil society, to hold in check the state, to serve as the 
moral pulse of society and to further democratic value. By reducing the power of the 
state and increasing the role of the market, it is assumed that civil society too will 
flourish and will in turn encourage further economic liberalization’ thereby playing the 
role of imperial agents. 
NGO programmes which aim to change the status quo to facilitate deregulation which 
the governments often resist but are coerced into through the Bretton Wood 
Institutions. These institutions give conditions for assistance ‘supposedly aimed at 
building peace’ but instead cause ‘economic crises, instability and violence’ (Bendana 
2006:10). The 2000 UN Report revealed that ‘poverty is increasing in those developing 
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economies that have the most open trade regimes’. Yet the same strategies are still 
used in almost two decades to follow. In a study conducted by Tandon (2002), it was 
noted that most explanations on Africa’s conflicts neglect the international aspects, 
preferring to conduct an internal diagnosis on the governance systems. The study 
argues that the cause of conflicts in Africa lie in poverty and underdevelopment which 
are a direct outcome of the integration of African economies into the global economy. 
Basically, the study argues that the conflicts in Africa are a direct cause of the denial 
of basic human needs which emanates from structural imperialism lamenting conflict 
practitioners for a lack of a holistic approach to causes of conflict. 
Mwesiga Baregu (2007:14) argued that Africa’s problems lie in the structures of 
production adding that the Bretton Woods institutions reinforce the position. Baregu 
contends that it is not failure of the economies to integrate into the systems but rather 
the structure of the systems which they are supposed to integrate into. Tandon 
(2000:1) shared similar views stating that ‘while poverty is at the root of conflict and 
violence, it is does not simply exist, but is created by the manner in which the region 
is integrated into the global economy’. In resonating with the structural imperialist 
theory, Shivji (2007:4) traces the shift in description of the global zones as developed 
and underdeveloped, where the latter was also cast as ‘uncivilized,’ hence the need 
for civil society groups which Tandon (2002:2) understood could be ‘created, nurtured 
and strengthened in aid recipient states.’ 
2.3.1 Globalisation 
Globalisation envisages a world where the market dictates everything, from political 
ethos, economic practice to socio-cultural activities. Thus, global dictates are driven 
by a free market where the haves determine the destiny of the have nots. Africa stands 
disadvantaged as its ‘rich natural resources are taken away from the continent at a 
fraction of their value’ (Tandon 2000:2). Thus, what globalisation has achieved in 
Africa is precisely the opposite of what it is glorified for by its propagators. Azar 
(1990:148) contended that globalization in the post-Cold War era would go against the 
Westphalian (1648) belief that groups will wither away as states get stronger. NGOs 
became agents for the realization of Azar’s prediction. 
Von Compe (2008:2) defined globalization as ‘westernization,’ where the global 
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market acted to erode nationalist thinking through trade, cultural exchange, technology 
amongst other platforms. Imperialism advocates for the free flow of capital where the 
role of the state is limited. Capital is controlled by the market rather than the state 
thereby exposing the weak. NGOs advocate for the full realisation of globalisation as 
a means for the promotion of human rights. In this regard, globalisation works against 
cultural security which is one of the tenets of basic human needs alluded to by Burton. 
2.3.2 Funding 
The issue of source of funding is critical to control and legitimacy. It is also tied to 
achievement of intended goal; where there is debate on who should spell out whether 
an objective has been achieved, that is, is it the donor or the recipient. Questions that 
arise are the origin of the objective. Edwards (1991) and Hanlon (1990) conducted a 
study in Mozambique where it was observed that ‘in 1990, 170 foreign NGOs were 
running programmes in complete isolation from the state,’ dividing the country into 
‘mini-kingdoms’ (Clark1991:4). The same study noted that Governments are also 
skeptical of NGOs that are heavily foreign funded for fear of infiltration of their masses. 
NGOs receive their funding from donors who often dictate what they want achieved by 
their funding. This determines the programmes conducted by NGOs. For example, 
most donor agencies in the post 1995 period preferred to fund policy formulation, 
democracy and human rights programmes ahead of any other forcing many NGOs to 
adopt such targets in order to remain relevant. The programmes are thus a prerogative 
of the donor rather than the interests of the recipient. While NGOs have been argued 
to be freelancers without a constituency like politicians, it can be argued that the 
donors are their constituency. They are accountable to the donor who prescribes the 
values and interests that they are identified with. Fowler (1992:11) notes that the 
economic processes that bring about the funds are external to the beneficiaries 
arguing that the funds could be investments to achieve certain processes in the 
recipient country that are meant to benefit the country that is donating.  Fowler argues 
that the recipients are not in any form party to the resource mobilization neither do 
they request for preference of their funding needs making them subjects of the 
donors(Ibid:11). 
In Rwanda, aid increased the GDP soon after the 1994 genocide, registering a 13% 
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growth in 1996 (National Institute of Statistics Rwanda: 1997) prompting critics of aid 
to claim that the Rwandan genocidal conflict was NGO propelled. Peter Uvin, a Swiss 
born NGO worker, casts ‘contradictions between the genocide and the attitude of 
donors who had until the last moment regarded Rwanda as a model of development 
in Africa’ (Brown et al 2007:42). NGOs thus contributed in delaying the recognition by 
the international community (UN included) of the magnitude of the conflict. 
Apart from financial and material resources, NGOs also receive human capital 
assistance from their governments who have expertise that they use to obtain 
‘legitimacy’ to carry out various operations. Steen (1996:146) notes that not only is 
there an apparent closeness between government and NGOs, but that there is also a 
significant exchange of employees between government and the NGO sector. This 
highlights the close relationship that exists between donor governments and NGOs. 
Mutasa (2014:16) noted that there is ‘a strong belief that CSOs working in reforms are 
pursuing a foreign agenda, operating as conduits of western propaganda. Shivji 
(2007:54) observed that heavy reliance and exclusive foreign funding was the biggest 
limitation for NGOs operating in developing countries, for, ‘whoever pays the piper 
calls the tune’ as the funders determined and placed limits on the NGOs programmes. 
Upon being appointed an AU Commissioner, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma expressed 
shock after discovering that over 97% of AU programmes are funded by donors. She 
implored upon governments to pay their dues for the benefit of the development 
agenda as well as realization of full liberation. Dlamini-Zuma likened donor funding to 
some form of bondage where there would be no ‘self-reliance’ (BDlive, 2012).  
Furthermore, the AU Headquarters building itself was built by the Chinese as a 
donation. Conflict resolution mechanisms have not been spared of this lack of self-
destiny in Africa. 
Addressing an NGO conference held in Washington on 21 May 2003, Andrew Natsios, 
head of USAID at the time, expressed dissatisfaction with U.S. NGOs for failing to 
magnify the US government’s role in providing food and medicines. Natsios 
emphasized that NGOs had to ensure that their operations were synchronized to the 
US foreign policy without which the department would withdraw their contracts and 
find new partners (The Globe and Mail, June 20, 2003).This had a net effect of 
reducing the humanitarian NGOs into a charity arm of the military.NGOs have also 
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been criticized for their business style survival tactics where they engage in extensive 
‘advertising’ of poverty in order to attract donations (Chandler 2001,Sujay 2009). They 
invite media to cover unforetold suffering of African people being oppressed by their 
heavily corrupt governments.  
2.3.3 Media 
Publicity is a key instrument in politics and business and so it is to NGOs. Begala et al 
(2006) noted that media influence governments and vice versa. Media is a key tool in 
seeking recognition and in influencing perceptions over a subject matter. During a war 
and even in cases of topical issues in public debate, propaganda is formidable tool 
that has withstood the taste of time. At election time the media helps to influence the 
issues voters should care about and even the criteria they should use to evaluate 
candidates. The various media houses select issues to put on spotlight to stimulate 
debate. Doing this, the media has the power to set and influence the political agenda 
in any country. Media houses such as BBC, France 24, CNN and Aljazeera have 
proved to be powerful enough to make or break governments. They transcend borders 
and influence voters. For example, in Ivory Coast following the 2011 electoral dispute, 
France 24 was instrumental in putting pressure on President Laurent Gbagboto step 
down to give way to President Qattara. In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya the BBC and CNN 
were instrumental in pressuring the ousting of ‘dictator’ governments.  
NGOs work closely with media houses to receive coverage of their work. They thrive 
on publicity. An organization needs to constantly communicate with its environment 
on performance and the reasons for its existence (Julie, 2007) while Hudock (2003), 
Ojo (2005) and Biswas (2007) content that media capacity is essential for the 
promotion of good governance and developmental matters. Furthermore, there is 
invariably a close linkage between governments, multi-national corporations, NGOs 
and media houses. The editorial policies of media houses and the programmes 
conducted by NGOs are usually in sync with the government’s policies. Sharma 
(2010), Rubin (2000) and Biswas (2007) identified the media’s important role in 
shaping public awareness and the need for NGOs to capitalise on that role in building 
awareness of their programmes through a strategic partnership for collaboration with 
media. 
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Kramer and Pemberton (2013) have described NGOs as being a tool of ‘war’ that is 
used during peacetime contending that the end of the Cold War saw the decline of 
interstate wars and the rise of NGO operations. They state that it was time for western 
governments to downsize the military and upsize the peacetime arsenal NGOs, which 
in turn saw a rise in intra state conflict, indicating a causal relationship between 
increased NGO operations and increased intra state conflict. 
2.3.4 NGOs and Development 
In Africa, development discourse is closely tied to NGOs. Most NGO operations are 
targeted at developing countries that are perceived to be in need of modernisation and 
development. Shivji (2005, 2007) argues that NGOs are precisely forerunners similar 
to the missionaries in Africa who paved way for colonialism. A study conducted by 
Hearn (2001) in South Africa, Ghana and Uganda revealed that ‘powerful northern 
states are able to influence significant social groupings in Africa’ depicting the absence 
of social autonomous forces. Manji (2007:7) contends that ‘development’ was coined 
to market a new form of domination after ‘civilisation’ had been noted to be derogatory 
and had gone with colonialism. Africa was now termed as ‘underdeveloped’ rather 
than ‘uncivilised’. 
The IMF and World Bank advance the notion of a global village where there is 
sustainable democracy, yet their structural programmes such as the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which has been implemented in Uganda, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe among other African countries has arguably brought about 
sustainable poverty, where the governments are only able to continue borrowing to 
survive. NGOs have had the challenge of portraying poverty as a technical issue that 
can be solved. This wrong diagnosis of the problem leads to a wrong prescription and 
is very detrimental in conflict management. Similar concerns are expressed by Banks 
and Hulme (2012) who noted that NGOs are too close to their donors than they are to 
the aid recipients leading to the belief that poverty can be eliminated by increasing 
access to resources. Banks and Hulme recommend a more holistic approach that 
addresses the structures and economic processes that brought about inequality. 
Contrary to expectations arising from the numerous developmental programmes 
conducted by NGOs, the European Commission Report (2012:6) stated that, 
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‘domestic revenues tend to be the most important source of development finance 
directly available to governments in the global south’ followed by remittances made by 
migrants working in the diaspora which the World Bank (2011) estimated to $372 
billion. The remittances total is almost three times that ($133.5 billion) provided in 
overseas aid in 2011 by member countries of the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
(McCloskey 2012:116). In the spirit of ‘partnerships for development’ NGOs assume 
responsibilities of local structures and some become funders of local NGOs who 
undertake activities with the mandate of the international organization. (Storey 2010: 
Shivji 2007, Hearn 2007). In this sense, development is restricted to formation of 
grassroot structures without necessarily transforming to poverty alleviation. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
Thus, NGO programmes in developing countries perpetuate the agendas of 
sponsoring countries more than they are responsive to the recipients’ needs. The 
resources that are mobilized into NGO programmes by donor countries are targeted 
at achieving particular systems that resonate with the donor countries’ interests. This 
research is guided by macro theories that set a platform for a holistic approach on 
further research on the roles of external players on domestic conflict rather than dwell 
on domestic challenges alone. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
NGOS IN ZIMBABWE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss the various phases and exponential growth of the NGO sector 
in Zimbabwe dwelling on major areas that attracted NGO operations. For purposes of 
this discussion, the main operations have been identified as being the land reform 
programme, democracy and human rights as well as elections and referenda. The 
chapter will begin by giving a brief background to the Zimbabwe pre-colonial era before 
giving the periodic developments of the conflict in Zimbabwe. Throughout the 
discussion the researcher will make constant reference to the prevailing international 
environment that impacted on Zimbabwe.While this chapter articulates the external 
components of the conflict in Zimbabwe, it does not attempt to claim that there were 
no internal shortcomings and challenges that contributed to the development of the 
crisis. 
3.2 BACKGROUND 
Social and political conflict in Zimbabwe is one of the widely debated issues in 
southern Africa and beyond. There are various perceptions and contentions of the 
conflict. This study is informed by the macro theories of conflict and it will focus on the 
influence exerted by international NGOs on the conflict management systems. 
Zimbabwe attained its independence (1980) when the international environment was 
progressing towards the fall of the Berlin wall (1989) and the triumph of the capitalist 
ideology. Western democracy was to shape the new world order and NGOs were key 
agents in ensuring conformity.This ideological shift accounts for some of the 
incoherent aspects that were at the core of conflict issues in the years to follow. Sabelo 
(2006:4) contends that the conflict in Zimbabwe is a result of a clash of two competing 
forces, the ‘annihilatory’ neo-liberalism and the pan-Africanist national position. 
Zimbabwe, like many other countries on the African continent, lagged behind in 
development. Donor funding, most of which was coming from western countries, was 
essential for the development programmes and poverty alleviation. This development 
assistance depended on ‘partnership’ which was determined in the ‘compliance nature 
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of the triad relationship between the state, donors and civil society’ (Hearn 2001:44). 
The failure of the triad relationship in Zimbabwe saw the withdrawal of funding 
assistance as well as the beginning of socio-economic and political conflict that 
affected Zimbabwe, the SADC region and the African continent as a whole. Cawthra 
(2010:26) traced the causes of the Zimbabwean conflict to the failure of the 1979 
Lancaster House Conference (which ended the liberation war) to resolve the land 
distribution imbalance. 
Dollard Dooband his colleagues (1939) proposed a hypothesis which traced 
aggressive behavior to denial or frustration of personal goals. The theory holds that 
whichever way, some aggression will be vented out as a result of frustration (Baron 
1992). In Zimbabwe, the denial of adequate living land produced frustrations and so 
did social-economic hardships that were experienced in the country during the 
research period. Some of the aggression was vented in the form of election violence. 
3.2.1 Historical perspective 
Zimbabwe attained its independence from British colonial rule through a protracted 
struggle which was heavily assisted by the eastern bloc countries during the Cold War 
era. Its political and socio-economic values were thus modelled in the communist 
approach which had to be modified to resonate with the western unipolar ideology that 
began in 1989. In the post–independence era, Zimbabwe enjoyed trade with Britain 
(the former colonial master), more than with other states. The economy relied heavily 
on revenue from export of raw materials which had adverse effects on industrial 
growth. There was limited formulation of developmental strategies that would 
involvereduction in export of raw materials. Clapham (1985:94) contends that this 
economic arrangement, which characterized many African post-colonial states, 
caused the new governments to epitomise the colonial governments in raw material 
export at the benefit of the former colonial state. The means of production continued 
to be alienated to the majority.  Although the country had a stable GDP, only a few 
whites, about 2%, of the population enjoyed the products of commerce (Government 
of Zimbabwe, 1981). Agriculture formed the backbone of the economy, yet about 1% 
of the population (white commercial farmers) had control of the agricultural sector. 
The 1979 Lancaster Conference was a lengthy negotiation process where the land 
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was highly contentious issue between the Margret Thatcher led Conservative British 
Government and the ZANLA and ZIPRA forces led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua 
Nkomo respectively. The constitution provided for a continuation of the status quo on 
land where about 6 000 white commercial farmers controlled 40% of arable land, 
employing one third of the waged labour force and practically responsible for about 
three quarters of the agricultural output (Cawthra 2010:26) 
Chitsike (2003:9) states ‘the major reason for the numerous amendments of both the 
constitution and the Land Acquisition Act was to ‘try and improve land being given for 
resettlement’. Numerous efforts were made to pursue land redistribution but the pace 
between 1980 and 1990 was almost insignificant.Despite this land occupation 
disparity, Zimbabwe’s economy, which was modelled along the communist thinking, 
grew steadily, with a GDP of 12%.The government expanded social services resulting 
in a triple increase in education expenditure from Z$227.6 million to Z$628 million 
while health rose from Z$66.4 million to Z$188.6 million between 1979 and 1989. This 
enabled the formerly marginalised black people to access social services. Expenditure 
on the public sector rose by 60% as the civil service steadily grew by 12% per annum. 
Unemployment was estimated at less than 10% and the social sector was performing 
well particularly the education and health sectors. (CSO Report 1990). 
In 1991 the Zimbabwe government following recommendations from the Bretton 
Woods institutions IMF and World Bank introduced Structural Adjustment (SAPS) 
programmes which marked the beginning of a rapid deterioration of the country’s 
economy. The IMF recommended ESAP which was launched in 1991 (first phase) and 
the second phase in 1996. ESAP, among other things recommended controls on per 
capita expenditure on non-profit making entities and promoted foreign export. The 
emphasis of saps lay with the ‘non-profit making’, which precisely was government, 
leaving the market forces to prevail. The cost of living rose and social services 
deteriorated as many workers were laid off and food subsidies were removed. This 
paved way for the NGOs to ‘fill’ the void left by government. NGOs like Red Banner, 
Care International and Development Aid from People to People (DAPP) operated 
mainly in the rural areas providing the masses with drought relief food hand outs and 
water boreholes (CSO Report 1990). 
ESAP also recommended currency devaluation which resulted in the real foreign 
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exchange value of exports in Zimbabwe declining by 2.7% per year while it had grown 
by 9% before SAPs (Jauch 2009). The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) 
pointed out that export orientation worsened poverty and disadvantaged small scale 
farmers who still had no access to suitable farming land. Real expenditures on health 
and education declined and food production decreased. The workers and the 
unemployed became alienated to their government as the effects of saps soured 
(Cawthra2010: 26). There was widespread discontentment on government’s 
deliverables and food riots became a common feature. It is not surprising that the 
second phase of ESAP is concluded in December 1997 and in January 1998, food 
riots began in Zimbabwe. 
3.3 LAND REFORM 
Bradshaw (2008:71) discusses the theory of structural violence in which a social 
system prevents people from meeting their basic needs. The Lancaster House 
Constitution that became Zimbabwe’s Constitution from 1980 to 2013 (when the 
referendum ushered in a new constitution) prescribed the manner in which land could 
be acquired by the government for redistribution to the masses. 
Land is arguably the bone of contention of the Zimbabwean conflict more than many 
other issues put together (Sabele 2006:3). Sabele further argues that the Zimbabwe 
conflict was triggered by a ‘nationalist attempt to resolve a delayed national question 
involving land restitution in a former settler colony’. At independence, Zimbabwe had 
a population of 12 million people, with 33 million hectares of arable land. 45% of this 
land was occupied by only 6000 white commercial farmers, while 5% was occupied by 
a few black commercial farmers while the remaining 50%, most of which was unfertile 
and found in drier regions was a preserve for more than700 000 black families. 
(Census Report 1992). 
The willing-buyer-willing-seller envisaged in the Lancaster House Constitution did not 
achieve its targets. In 1999 the government enunciated the compulsory land 
acquisition which empowered it to gazette into state land those farms that were 
previously owned by mostly whites for redistribution to the masses. This move saw the 
farmers (mainly white commercial farmers) and the business sector drifting into conflict 
with government. The farmers and business argued that the government had violated 
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their property rights while the government raised the issues of non-compliance to 
official agreements by the British government and further maintained that the land had 
been unjustly taken from the blacks during colonial rule. There was a diplomatic stand-
off between Harare and London which soon drew in the United States of America 
(USA) and the European Union. NGOs, mostly from those western countries, entered 
the conflict space by taking sides with the mostly British commercial farmers and 
business. As parties proliferate, so do issues, reducing the space for possible 
resolution and the conflict spirals (Carpenter and Kennedy2001:14). While most 
Zimbabweans were concerned about land, unemployment and social service delivery 
(bread and butter issues) some of the NGOs demanded other freedoms such as gay 
rights which were alienated to the masses. The involvement of third parties, the 
international community and the media escalated the commitment the parties had to 
the conflict and reduced the communication space available to the adversaries. 
3.4 GROWTH OF THE NGO SECTOR 
The growth of NGO activity in Zimbabwe followed a path that is closely related to 
economic and political developments in the country. This section will critically examine 
the relationship between the rise in NGO programmes and the political and economic 
growth. NGOs were portrayed as non-state therefore ‘democratic, autonomous and 
self-determining’ (Sachikonye 2014:30). Sachikonye argues that civil society should 
not be viewed as an alternative to government as it lacks ‘coercive authority, power 
and popular mandate through election’. Furthermore, civil society is very diverse 
lacking central command and as such runs the risk of regressing developing countries 
to the state of nature, where conflict is rife and development remains a dream. 
3.4.1 Periodic developments 
3.4.1.1 2000 to 2005 
As the people were suffering the effects of saps, and the government felt more and 
more pressure to deliver the liberation war promises, NCA and other NGOs continued 
to push for a new constitution. A Commission was set up tasked to do the outreach 
and come up with a draft that would be adopted or rejected in a national referendum. 
‘The draft constitution contained provisions relating to the acquisition of land for 
resettlement and it also placed the onus for providing compensation for the acquired 
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farms on the former colonial power. The government would no longer be obliged to 
pay compensation for the acquired land except for infrastructural improvements’ 
(Chitsike 2003:9). The draft constitution was put before a referendum that saw a wide 
political debate on issues surrounding tenure of public office. Opposition parties and 
NGOs campaigned for a ‘NO Vote’ while the ruling ZANU (PF) party campaigned for 
a ‘YES Vote’. Issues in the draft constitution were largely polarised and the no vote 
triumphed. Following the rejection of the referendum, an amendment to the Lancaster 
House Constitution (Amendment No. 17) was made which provided for the compulsory 
acquisition of land for redistribution. The following election, (parliamentary) in 2005 
proved that land was the game changer, ZANU (PF) won. If land was not a pertinent 
issue then ZANU (PF) would not have achieved political expediency through it.  
Following the Zimbabwe-Britain impasse over land redistribution, donor funding that 
was previously channeled through government, especially in health care, was also 
withdrawn resulting in a near collapse of the health sector. The education and health 
sectors were the worst adversely affected by the donor withdrawal. The adverse 
effects on social services delivery heavily angered the masses putting them on a 
conflict path with the government. (Mass Public Opinion Institute, 2006) Howell and 
Pearce (2000:83) also note that civil society cannot really be grown from “outside”; it 
comes from within society; it reacts to specific historical, social and cultural contexts. 
Many local NGOs receiving western funding shifted their attention from programmes 
such as small businesses development, agriculture and education to human rights and 
governance issues in order for them to get funding. Peater (2011) writes how the 
external interest in agricultural production in Zimbabwe contrasts the local 
humanitarian need. The international donor ‘agencies are so big that they can hardly 
see the wood, never mind the trees – and certainly not the bugs that live on the trees, 
in whose name the work is being done’ (Ibid:1).A plethora of NGOs working in various 
sectors emerged filling the ‘vogue among the donor-community’ (Shivji 2005:13) for 
the fight for property rights, human rights abuse and bad governance. Thus the agenda 
was arguably determined by the need to achieve the goal of the donor rather than the 
people of Zimbabwe. 
By year 2000 active civil society organisations working in fields such as democracy, 
human rights, youth empowerment and humanitarian assistance, were scattered 
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across Zimbabwe and  working with the people at local governance level. These were 
largely supported by international NGOs and often had more capacity and funding 
than the state structures. This scenario created a parallel to the situation of Osh, in 
Kyrgyzstan as enunciated in a study done by Schwarzenbach (2011) where it was 
established that NGOs had alienated the government from the people who now looked 
up to NGOs more than government for their needs giving a hybrid political order. In 
the Osh study, like in Zimbabwe, NGOs became a defacto government with NGOs 
such as CARE International, USAID and GOAL being looked up to by the needy 
communities more than they did to government. Safaids also provided HIV and AIDS 
patients with testing and counseling as well as ART when the government was 
struggling to do so.  
It is difficult to determine in Zimbabwe the amount of money projected into various 
NGO programmes as some of the organisations would do so clandestinely particularly 
when they rolled out operations that were deemed by the government to be politically 
oriented (Reserve Bank Of Zimbabwe, 2008). However, in the period under study, the 
international focus for NGO funding shifted from developmental programmes to 
democracy and good governance. Organisations such as Red Banner, Save the 
Children and began to scale down while those in democracy and human rights such 
as Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), National Constitutional Association 
(NCA) and Crisis Coalition became more prominent. The suitability approach replaced 
the early humanitarian need approach that guided the evolution of NGOs as 
conceptualized in the 1863 International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC). 
Organisations were forced to embark on introspection and cleansing to make 
themselves suitable to receive donor aid as it was no longer based on need, but rather, 
conformity to human rights adherence. Aid became conditional, a negation of the UN 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Organisations that received aid had to 
conform to certain requirements and tastes in order to receive donor funding. Failure 
to conform resulted in non-funding (World Bank, 2003). 
New NGOs emerged, offering goods and services that were supposed to be the role 
of the state, for example, distribution of food aid in drought stricken areas and HIV and 
AIDS testing and counseling as well as well as provision of ARVs. A strong civil society 
emerged much to the detriment of state power but with little or no tangible 
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development. Schwarzenbach (2011) noted that contrary to the perception of a 
mainstream discourse on failed states, local realities established that the void was 
being filled by NGOs who were creating a quasi-government. It can be argued that in 
this sense aid increased the chances for conflict. In Rwanda, aid increased the GDP 
without improving the standards of living of the ordinary people prompting critics of aid 
to claim that the Rwandan genocidal conflict was NGO propelled. Peter Uvin, a Swiss 
born NGO worker casts ‘contradictions between the genocide and the attitude of 
donors who had until the last moment regarded Rwanda as a model of development 
in Africa.’ Brown et al (2007:42). NGOs thus contributed in delaying the recognition by 
the international community (UN included) of the magnitude of the conflict. In 
Zimbabwe, the GDP improved between year 2009 and 2012 without meaningful 
progress on production arguably, due to donor funding in a similar scenario to that of 
Rwanda. 
David Rieff (2004:185) notes the politicization of the context of receiving aid in 
Zimbabwe during the famine in 2002. Reiff detects an approval by aid groups to 
categorise recipients into deserving and non-deserving poor where suffering in the 
short term to produce an acceptable government was justifiable for long term benefit. 
Reiff argues that humanitarian aid is only meant to alleviate suffering and should not 
be used to attempt to correct perceived anomalies. 
In cities where most human rights and governance programmes were conducted, 
clashes were vivid between government and local western funded organisations such 
as NCA, ZESN, Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe (CCZ), Gays and Lesbians Association 
of Zimbabwe (GALZ) amongst others. There was widespread unrest as most of the 
civic society groups undertook demonstrations to put pressure on government for 
various laws. In the rural areas, most NGO operations were in food distribution 
programmes and the provision of water. These were mainly conducted by 
organisations such as Care International, GOAL, World Food Programme. This led to 
a scenario pararel to the situation of Osh, in Kyrgyzstan as enunciated in a study done 
by Schwarzenbach (2011) where it was established that NGOs had alienated the 
government from the people who now looked up to NGOs more than government for 
their needs giving a hybrid political order. 
They became embroiled in conflict as the government alleged discriminate food 
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distribution, where villages that supported opposition political parties received food aid 
while those perceived to be supporters of the ruling party were sanctioned. The 
suitability card was allegedly being played on the humanitarian need. In a bid to curb 
the alleged politicisation of outreach programmes, the government made it mandatory 
for NGOs to work with provincial and district structures in all their programmes. This 
move was intended at giving a ‘government face’ on the aid and to curb undue 
politicisation. It did not however, work as the donors withdrew their aid. As the 
government used various pieces of legislature to curb demonstrations and unrest, 
NGOs did not only worsen tense relations between government and the citizens but 
even led the clashes. The government made amendments to laws governing the 
operations of NGOs culminating in the 2004 NGO Bill which sought to regulate and 
limit the space for NGO activities. 
In passing the 2004 NGO Bill, the government explained that same had to be 
understood in the context of political polarisation which had seen the United States 
and European Union impose sanctions on Zimbabwe leading to all western bilateral 
government to government aid being stopped. The donors began to channel aid 
directly to NGOs. The Bill was declared to be a counter measure to western attack 
and targeted INGOs and local NGOs who were western funded. The statement added 
that though the organisations claimed independence, the government had charged 
them with improper links and maintained that they used the guise of human rights 
activism while pursuing political agendas (Zimbabwe Government Statement: August 
20, 2014). In response to the Bill, the National Association of Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NANGO) expressed warning that the country could experience 
economic repercussions from the regulation. The circumstances surrounding the NGO 
Bill highlight both the inclusion and involvement of NGOs in the conflict in Zimbabwe.  
3.4.1.2 2006 to 2010 
During this period, demonstrations and running battles characterized the relations 
between the state and NGOs. There was intense media coverage of government’s 
responses to NGO operations which portrayed the government as ‘draconian’ and 
autocratic and not accommodative to civil society operations. President Mugabe’s long 
incumbency became a serious issue with civic organisations such as Crisis Coalition 
and NCA with NCA clamouring for a constitution that would limit Presidential terms 
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(NCA Draft Constitution 2001:40). Asserting a different opinion, Sabele (2006:5) 
argues that while the long incumbency ‘is part of the crisis, it does not warrant the 
reduction of the crisis to a single individual.’ The EU ‘smart sanctions’ that were 
imposed on Zimbabwe and the American Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic 
Recovery Act (2001) (ZIDERA) further crippled the economy which was already in 
turmoil. As the economy of Zimbabwe heavily relied on trade with Britain and other 
western countries, the country suffered a major downturn. Inflation rose to 
unprecedented levels ‘reaching an all-time high of 2,660,522.20 percent in July of 2008’ 
(http://www.tradingeconomics.com 2014:1). The 2.6 million percent rate of inflation was 
too dramatic and indicative of Sabele’s (2006) contention that the crisis was being 
driven by something more than the alleged internal maladministration.  
The 2010 Global Humanitarian Assistance Organisation Report, summarising the 
preceding year’s activities, stated that ‘humanitarian aid is not just about how much 
money was spent and by whom; it’s also about how and where it is spent. Every choice 
made, to which country and through which organization, by which mechanism to which 
sector of life – has an impact not only in-country but also well beyond intervention 
itself.’ The whole question of qualification to receive aid is driven by ‘interest’ as 
enunciated in the realist school of thought of international relations. There is a sharp 
contrast between the human rights envisaged in the 1948 UN Declaration of Human 
Rights and the practice of the concept of in the post-Cold War era. Humanitarian 
assistance in the unipolar era begins to be qualified, where qualification is guided by 
vested interest on the outcomes of intervention that are not necessarily preservation 
of the sanctity of human life. 
Years 2007-8 saw the height of the crisis as most businesses failed to operate and 
goods and services were scarce. All commodities, including food stuffs were scarce 
on the market and the situation was worsened by the drought that hit the region. The 
2008 harmonised elections were very contentious and were marred by violence. 
NGOs were very active in civic education and like in the Mozambique study (Clark 
1991:47), aid was being channeled to budding social organisations that were 
committed to the market economy and not necessarily determined by recipient needs.  
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3.5 ELECTIONS AND REFERENDA 
Elections are by their very nature competitive and give rise to conflict. Instead of being 
an instrument for democracy, elections in Africa have become a threat to ‘social order, 
economic development and efforts towards regional integration. Worse still, elections 
have emerged as the most recent source of conflict across Africa (African Union 
2010:1). Many social conflict theorists researching on electoral conflict focus on the 
internal institutions administering an election while disregarding the external 
environment of the state in an election and the parties involved in the election process. 
Conflict resolution needs to address the causes of the conflict and not just its 
manifestation. The African Union 2010 report recons the escalation of election related 
conflict and proposes the formulation of ‘proactive strategies aimed at preventing, 
managing and resolving election related conflicts and redressing political violence’ 
(2010:1). This approach risks the formulation of strategies that may fail to address the 
underlying causes of the conflict and may only work either to suppress the 
manifestation of conflict or shift it from the electoral stage to some other place.  
Lasko (2007:227) defined electoral conflict as ‘an activity motivated by an attempt to 
affect the results of the elections either by manipulating the electoral procedure and 
participation or by contesting the legitimacy of the results. In Zimbabwe elections have 
brought about political, economic and even violent escapades on the social scene. 
Election time has proved to be an opportunity to vent out frustrations stored from 
previous matters. The solution does not necessarily lie in the legal framework 
governing the elections, but rather in identifying the causes of such latent conflict for 
possible resolution or management. Human needs theory calls for the necessity to 
address human needs that lie behind conflict. Attempts to resort to other mechanisms 
have proved inadequate in resolving the conflict in Zimbabwe as demonstrated by the 
numerous amendments to electoral laws. In elections that took place in the period 
under review, many NGOs took part in various capacities, such as voter education, 
observers, capacity building and other portfolios but the level of conflict in elections 
also increased. 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report (2009:4) describes 
election related violence as ‘acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm 
perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that rise in the context of electoral 
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competition’. Fischer (2002:2) sees electoral conflict and violence as tactics in political 
competition as parties thrive to outwit each other. Electoral conflict may, however, be 
manifestation of frustration accumulated elsewhere. NGOs in Zimbabwe have 
influenced and participated in the course of electoral conflict. 
3.5.1 NGOs and elections 
NGOs such as Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) Electoral Institute for 
Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), International Fellowship of Evangelical 
Students (IFES) and Election Resource Centre (ERC) rolled out programmes that 
concentrated on critical election processes in Zimbabwe. They conducted outreach 
programmes civic education and lobbied the electoral management body and 
parliament for changes in the electoral processes. ZANU (PF) alleged that NGOs that 
engaged in civic education sought to coin their education material in such a manner 
that it campaigned for the main opposition party Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC-T) and also lobbied for changes in electoral laws. The parties made accusations 
and counter accusations against each other. The conflict escalated as described by 
Pruitt and Rubin (1986, in Anstey 2006:35) with a self-reinforcing circle of action and 
reaction between the parties. When parties want to win at any cost the conflict turns 
destructive and they bear costs that they are not committed to (Carpenter and 
Kennedy, 2001:14). The government responded by enacting a regulation that made it 
mandatory for all civic organisations intending to do voter education to have the 
content of their education material approved by the electoral management body, 
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) for its political neutrality as prescribed in the 
ZEC Act Section 15(1)(d) of 2007. 
 
NGO humanitarian assistance in the drought stricken 2008 election period was also 
characterised by allegations of attempts to sway the vote in favour of the MDC. CARE 
International and GOAL Zimbabwe were accused of giving food assistance to MDC 
supporters only. In towns, violent escapades were often committed by youths and 
NGOs such as The Amani Trust, Amnesty International and the Zimbabwe Peace 
Project (ZPP) opened ‘safe houses’ where the youths who would have committed ‘hits’ 
went to hide from police arrest. The police conducted intermittent raids on the 
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suspected properties in search of the alleged perpetrators (Zimbabwe Independent 
2006/12/15; SW Radio Africa 2002/8/30). 
3.5.2 Election Funding 
In addition to the various organizations undertaking interest in governance issues, 
donors from mainly western countries pooled their resources in organizations such as 
Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), IFES and UNDP to fund ZEC. They 
selected the programmes they were interested in funding and they invested a lot of 
interest in the outcome of the election. Most funded capacity building exercises and 
consultative workshops which aimed at ‘opening up’ systems in apparent similarities 
to the liberalization drive of globalization leading to structural imperialism. 
3.6 MEDIA 
In a crisis situation the media can set the tone for public debate, influencing the issues 
that people discuss. Media has the power to make or unmake governments, hence 
the saying that, the pen is mightier than the bullet. Propaganda is a critical weapon in 
any conflict. At election time the media sets the criteria for the evaluation of candidates. 
In Zimbabwe issues to do with ‘human rights’, property rights and gay rights become 
topical in the media during election time. (Mutere 2006:5) contends that the Rwandan 
genocide was instigated by a radio bulletin, demonstrating the power of the media. 
The various media houses depending with their editorial policies select issues to put 
on spotlight to stimulate debate. In doing this, the media exercises the power to set 
the political agenda. Media houses such as BBC, France 24, CNN and Aljazeera have 
proved to be powerful enough to make or break governments. Globalization has been 
described in the media fraternity as the “CNN-isation” of the world following the global 
capacity that CNN has. 
In the Zimbabwean conflict NGOs ensured publicity of their programmes and often 
worked with the media to air their views of alleged governmental malpractices and 
stressed commitment to stamp out bad governance. NGOs embarked on open 
confrontation with the government and as Collingwood (2006:442) stated the 
‘commonly held image of operational NGOs providing relief to the suffering is certainly 
valid but no longer as typical’ was the case in Zimbabwe.  
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With the use of the media, conflict escalation became easy and de-escalation difficult 
(Mitchell, 1981:63).Escalation takes place through various forms including image 
painting which makes the media very instrumental in modern conflict. Personal egos 
of leaders of political parties are also hardened when positions are made publicized 
and climbing down becomes difficult. As parties resorted to image painting, some of 
the issues reported on media were critically biased and not necessarily representative 
of the situation.  
Biased reporting by the media distorts information and affects perceptions. Reporting 
on a ten year study, Scoones (2010) stated that ‘contrary to the political and media 
stereotypes of abject failure, the land reform programme in Zimbabwe was 
experiencing success’. In Zimbabwe public and private media reporting was shaped 
by political inclinations and this also determined the issues covered. NGO 
programmes and views received wider coverage on private media than they did on 
state controlled media. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
The growth of the NGO sector in Zimbabwe was closely associated to developments 
in its internal and external political environment. Furthermore, the sector was guided 
more by economic and political activities than by humanitarianism confirming the 
notion that NGO programmes are donor driven and not responsive to recipient needs. 
The next chapter discusses the methodology used to conduct the study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter will discuss the methodology used by the researcher to explore the 
influence of international NGOs on the conflict management systems in Zimbabwe. 
The Chapter will focus on the research design, the instruments used, the population 
identified and the sample used. It also details the data collection and analysis 
procedures that were adopted by the researcher. The study was qualitative and as 
such, research on the subject matter was investigated using the context and setting in 
the given environment (Neuman 2011:165).The researcher used grounded theory 
approach, using information that emerges from the research itself.  
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research is qualitative and interpretive, seeking to understand phenomenon from 
the contextual understanding of the chosen population. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) 
argue that interpretivism is a key component of qualitative research. This research 
used grounded theory which is specific and does not subject the research to other 
existing theories but aims to develop findings and theories from the data and research 
process. The researcher set out the objectives of the study and collected data, coding 
it as it comes and coming up with analysis until saturation was reached. The process 
was both inductive and deductive. Charmaz (2000; 2006) emphasize the need for 
coding and identifying concepts as they emerge from the data. Glasser and Strauss 
(1967) founded grounded theory under the notion that qualitative research needed to 
interpret data in the form it is understood by the research participant. 
Both primary and secondary data was collected for the study. Secondary data was 
gathered through desktop research while primary data was collected through 
interviews from participants working on the subject matter. In collecting primary data, 
the researcher, consistent with the tenets of grounded theory, used a research guide 
(See appendix 1) with open ended questions to ensure that data was collected in the 
manner it is understood by the participant. There were no preconceived hypotheses 
to test or guided responses. This allowed the researcher to interact with data as it 
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unfolded rather than trying to select the data that suited structured themes. Neuman 
(2011:175) contends that the use of grounded theory in qualitative research helps the 
researcher to remain ‘open to the unexpected’ and allows flexibility as well as the 
interaction of data and theory. It was not the aim of the research to generate theory 
but rather to come up with key findings about the topic. (Sarantakos 2005) contends 
that grounded theory does not always have to end in theory generation, but can be 
used to make substantial findings that can be used for further research. 
4.3 SAMPLING PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES 
The research used non-probability sampling methods. Purposive sampling was used 
to come up with the initial list of participants who were selected because of their access 
and interaction with the data sought. Those who are affected by the conflict did not 
form part of the sample as the sample sought for knowledge based participants rather 
than experiential. Furthermore experiential participants would do well for a follow up 
study and would require the use of quantitative data collection tools. Snowball 
sampling was also used as the selected participants recommended others for 
selection. Thus, referrals made by participants on the initial list from purposive 
sampling were included in the sample (Corbetta 2003:222). This gave the study the 
latitude to draw participants from various organizations based on their knowledge and 
expertise. In guarding against the selection of participants who share similar views, 
the researcher made use of information gathered in Chapters 2 and 3 to come up with 
a list of balanced view respondents. (Ibid: 222). 
Twenty (20) participants were interviewed. Although the number of participants used 
in the study does not necessarily ensure representativeness of the population, it 
facilitates analytical generalizations and it suffices for qualitative research (Sarantakos 
2005:155,163) 
4.4 RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS 
The researcher designed an introduction letter (see appendix 1) which was used to 
introduce the researcher and the study to participants. The researcher also designed 
an informed consent form (see appendix 2) that was signed by the respondents to 
confirm knowledge and acceptance to participate in the research. A research guide 
was designed to guide the data collection discussions (See appendix 3).     
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4.5 DATA COLLECTION  
Respondent selection was done based on purposive sampling in the form of 
snowballing, referrals and personal contacts. Contact of first respondents was 
facilitated by the attendance of a workshop that was held in Harare on the 23rd of 
October 2014. This workshop was under the theme, ‘Zimbabwe Going Forward: 
Opportunities and Constraints’, organised by Konrad Adenauer Foundation and Mass 
Public Opinion Institute (MPOI). This workshop attracted many people from different 
sectors of the country; NGOs, government ministry, parastatals, academics and 
ambassadors, the diplomatic, churches, students, lawyers, human rights specialists, 
researchers, political analysts, economists and many others. Attendance of this 
workshop gave impetus for the first contacts since it was possible to exchange 
contacts and book for appointments for the interviews.  
Appointments were made and the first interviews were done on the 31st of October. 
The snowballing method was followed as these respondents referred us to the other 
participants. The profiles of the respondents are summarised in the Table 3.1 below.  
Table 3.1: Profile of Key Informants  
Date Designation of interviewee Pseudonym 
31-10-14 A prominent Independent Analyst VM 
31-10-14 Legal Practitioner SZ 
31-10-14 Works in the military KC 
31-10-14 
Executive Director at Transparency International 
Zimbabwe 
MJ 
30-10-14 Researcher and political analyst HK 
29-10-14 Lecturer  HZ 
29-10-14 Master of Economics degree Student MP 
29-10-14 Academic LM 
28-10-14 Lecturer AM 
28-10-14 Executive Director for an NGO SM 
27-10-14 Senior Economist MD 
27-10-14 Government TD 
27-10-14 Archivist GB 
23-10-14 Development Practitioner in Peace Building Initiatives.  EM 
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Date Designation of interviewee Pseudonym 
08-11-14 NGO EK 
08-11-14 Legal Practitioner TC 
05-11-14 Legal Advisor PB 
04-11-14 Research and NGO SN 
04-11-14 
Programmes Coordinator-partners with various NGOs 
in development programmes. 
GM 
01-11-14 Human Development Consultant GC 
After signing the informed consent form data collection was done using the interview 
guide (Appendix 1). As a contextualizing orientation to the interview, an introductory 
question was added prior to the commencement of section A. the orientation asked, 
‘What is your professional background as regards to your knowledge and/or interaction 
with the NGO sector?’ such a question was found meritorious especially given that 
some of the respondents were found through snowballing. Therefore it helped in the 
understanding not only the qualification of the respondent but also the diversity of the 
backgrounds from which the respondents were coming from.  
Following the guide (Appendix X), the first section focused on the understanding of the 
conflict, adequacy of conflict resolution in Zimbabwe, existence of INGO’s influence 
on conflict resolution and role, if any, of the former colonial power in the conflict 
resolution. The second and last section focussed on the NGOs’ efforts that are their 
contributions to conflict emergence, relations with local conflict management 
institutions and relations with government.  
Although, the questions were numbered and also in different sections, the interviewing 
was very flexible and could follow the flow of the interview as long as it remains in 
context. The interviews were done as in-depth interviews (IDIs) that intended to gain 
maximum information. Probing was very important as some of the respondents turned 
to be ambiguous given the sensitivity of some of the issues.  The verbal responses 
were recorded verbatim using a BELL OFFICE pro-series voice recorder (model no: 
DVR-6006) with internal memory of 4 Gigabytes. The recordings from this device were 
very clear and the memory was enough to accommodate all the interviews (330 
megabytes). 
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4.6 DATA PREPARATION AND TRANSCRIPTION 
Data from the digital audio recorder was transferred to a computer and uploaded in 
player software designed to assist the transcription of audio files (Express Scribe 
Transcription Software Website: http://www.nch.com.au/scribe/index.html). This 
transcribing software offered valuable features such as variable speed playback, multi-
channel control and file management. Transcripts were made using MS Word and 
using the hot keys; Express scribe was played and controlled in the background. 
During the transcription, all the substantive questions were formatted into Heading 1 
in preparation for the interpretation during the Nvivo analysis. 
4.7 DATA ANALYSIS 
Grounded theory framework was used for data analysis, with themes and models 
being derived from the data. Thus, the themes and models produced for data analysis 
were deduced from the data. Data was not inserted in preconceived categories; rather 
the data formed the categories whose relations were inferred as the analyst’s 
engagement with the data matured.  Analysis was done with the aid of NVivo (V.10), 
a Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software. The software program was 
found appropriate, because it effectively manage large amounts of qualitative data 
Nvivo facilitated the construction of relational networks identifying the content and 
structure of respondents’ opinions (Smyth, 2006). It involves the development of tree 
like structure of relationships between and among the themes (nodes). Data were 
coded to nodes that were nested in the way that showed the way the relationships 
were understood. As a result, parent, child, grandparent and sibling nodes were used. 
Below is an example of a model of how the thematic grounded nodes were organized: 
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Figure 4.1: The Conflict Cycle 
This model was developed from the responses given in and around the issue of 
understanding the conflict. Therefore, Conflict Cycle is a child node to Conception of 
conflict, a parent node to Conflict and Resolution, a grandparent node to conflicting 
interests and ideologies and Reaction to erupted conflict. Deficiency and Competition 
are sibling nodes with a common parent (conflicting interests or ideologies). 
Developments of such models indicate thematic engagement with data at 
superordinate level with grounded emergent themes.  
The analysis process was very iterative as it involved reading all the transcripts, 
picking and inserting verbatim chunks in conjectured categories. Coding relevant text 
into the Nvivo nodes was the beginning of data reduction. Various other methods were 
used during the analysis, for example keywords - in – context (KWIC) were utilized to 
reveal how respondents used words in context by comparing words that appear before 
and after “key words”. This is exemplified below: 
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Figure 4.2: Cluster analysis 
Cluster analysis was also done to analyse word and coding similarities. Below is an 
example of these analyses: 
 
Figure 4.3: Tree maps 
Tree maps were also produced to show the spread and proportion of codes in the 
node. A typical map is shown below: 
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Figure 4.4: Nodes compared by number of items coded 
Extracts from the transcripts were also presented. These data displays were a 
framework of data analysis characterized by referenced text extracts. Extracts from 
Nvivo were suffixed with an automatically generated link to the original data and the 
percentage of that text relative to the total text in that transcript.  Below, is an example 
of a text extract from MD: 
Recently the development donors have been coming on board mainly on 
political reasons to the extent that the government has developed these 
guidelines giving a clear platform that when the development partners want to 
come they should clearly state what they want to do. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\MD> - § 1 reference coded [3.35% Coverage] 
The link at the bottom shows that the data came from internal uploads (Internals), in 
the folder of transcripts (transcripts), it was MD’s transcript and finally this constituted 
3.37% of the total transcript. Such referencing increased the trustworthiness and 
conformability of the data and the interpretation process. That link is key to the search 
of the data in the NVivo project. 
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Succinctly, Nvivo was instrumental in engaging huge data into themes by creating 
nodes directly from the data; use of the memos and links to record and incorporate 
ideas, reflections and interpretations as data analysis unfolds; development of models 
from a tentative conceptual framework, compiling models that demonstrate the 
connections of the data by showing the arrangement of a tree and free nodes in 
concept maps. The project is a historical record as everything that was done (including 
creation of a node and statistics about the number and type of responses collected to 
all nodes) was recorded in date and time saved in the project which can be accessed 
and verified if the need arises. It forms an excellent audit trail to the analysis process.  
4.7.1 Validity and reliability 
In qualitative research validity is mainly concerned with ‘achieving authenticity than 
realising a single version of truth’ (Neuman 2011:214) where authenticity refers to a 
fair, honest and balanced account of social life. (Ibid: 214). (Sarantakos 2005:86) adds 
‘objectivity …credibility, transferability, conformability’ as being equivalent to validity. 
The researcher endeavoured to achieve conformability by collecting accurate 
perceptions of the respondents and not to rely on the researcher’s own construction 
(Smyth, 2006). Following the grounded theory principles, the researcher was sensitive 
to the data. The NVivo project is a historical record as everything that was done 
(including creation of a node and statistics about the number and type of responses 
collected to all nodes) was recorded in date and time saved in the project which can 
be accessed and verified if the need arises. It forms an excellent audit trail to the 
analysis process.  
Data was collected in its original form through the use of a research guide with open 
ended questions which would enable participants to pour out their experiences and 
understanding without constrictions. Meanwhile the guide was essential to direct the 
discussions to collect the required data. This would also ensure that the same 
information is collected from all the participants with the advantage of retaining 
originality which is fundamental to qualitative data. (Ibid: 86). Open ended questions 
also sought to ensure that data is not contaminated. Furthermore, validity was also 
addressed in data analysis through what (Sarantakos, 2005: 86) termed, 
‘argumentative validation’ where findings were presented in such a manner that the 
conclusions are traceable and can be confirmed. 
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Yin (2003) refers to credibility as the extent to which the researcher captures and 
represents the reality of how things really are from others.’ Thus, credibility was 
accomplished through methodological rigor, triangulations of document analysis and 
interpretations throughout the study. Credibility of findings was also accomplished 
through in – depth data collection that was sought from individual interviews. Credibility 
was established through the development of an early familiarity with participant 
through preliminary visits for the appointments. Member checking was also used to 
enhance the study’s credibility. It was achieved though checking accuracy of the data 
during the interviews usually through probes. Member checking was also in the plan 
of digitally recording the responses, for it was intended to have access to these later 
to check the responses. Furthermore, Nvivo assisted in accomplishing credibility as it 
allowed gathering opinion categories that are sensitive to the sources and can be 
traced in absolute precision to their sources.  
Reliability refers to ‘dependability and consistency’ despite the constantly changing 
setting that may need varied measures that cannot be repeated (Neuman 2011:214). 
This study also enhanced reliability by employing two (2) research assistants whose 
interaction with data was beneficial to the study as they interrogated various facets on 
the issues that arose in data collection. It also increased objectivity by enhancing focus 
in measuring what was meant to be measured and eliminating subjectivity and 
misinterpretation. (Barbie 2014:152). This was done by ensuring a thorough 
interrogation of data in its responsiveness to the objectives of the study. The inclusion 
of international NGOs operating in many African countries in the sample was aimed at 
achieving generalisability of the findings in Zimbabwe in other African countries 
(Sarantakos 2005: 90, 98). 
4.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The researcher followed ethics clearance procedures at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University and received ethics clearance reference number H/13/ART/PGS-0034.  
The researcher used a letter of introduction, (See appendix 2) for self-introduction as 
well as the study. This was done to ensure transparency and to allow respondents to 
make an informed decision about participation. The respondents gave written informed 
consent indicating their willingness to participate in the research. (See Appendix 3 - 
informed consent form - which the researcher adhered to). Participants willingly signed 
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for inclusion in the study, and they were each given a copy of the consent form. For 
any further communication the researcher’s contact details were attached in the 
consent form. During interviews, the researcher assured the participants on 
confidentiality and maintained awareness to sensitive information that could hurt the 
emotions of the interviewee. At data analysis stage, the researcher then divorced the 
participants’ responses from their identity to protect them from any harm.(Babbie 
2002:55-58, Neuman:145-149). 
4.9 BIAS 
The researcher addressed the issue of Zimbabwe’s polarised environment by 
divorcing the study from personal political affiliation. This was done to allow honesty 
and freedom of expression and distance personal views while allowing the researcher 
to generate richer data (Munhall 1988). The use of assistants in data collection also 
controlled for bias as it enabled data collection from various angles. 
4.10 CONCLUSION 
The research methodology chosen for the study enabled exploration of the subject 
matter through the use of appropriate instruments, sampling and data collection 
procedures. The presentation of data and the analytical procedures enriched the study 
by its rigour leading to dependability. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DATA PRESENTATION 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Data was collected from 20 participants using indepth interviews (IDIs). Results are 
presented in form of diagrams, tree maps, text query searches and participants 
verbatim quotations created by Nvivo software tool from transcripts. Presented below 
in Figure 4.1 is the cluster analysis of wording and coding similarities. Although the 
participants come from different backgrounds, the coding similarity indicated that there 
was a dichotomous divide in which most of the participants (14) had same codes and 
the others (6) are also similar.  
 
Figure 5.1: Cluster analysis for word and coding similarity for participants 
These participants came from different backgrounds as shown in figure 4.1 below.  
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Figure 5.2: Background of participants 
The views of the academics were largely similar with those of the independent analysts 
and researchers hence the association line. However, the association line between 
the government workers and NGOs in Figure 5.2 above is more of the former’s scrutiny 
of the later. These similarities were also revealed in the word similarity cluster analysis 
in Figure 5.3 below.  
 
Figure 5.3: Background word similarity cluster analysis 
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As shown in figure 5.4 below, most participants came from the NGOs and CSOs, 
followed by Independent analysts and researchers, then the government workers. The 
academic and legal background had the list frequencies.  
 
Figure 5.4: Proportions of backgrounds 
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5.2 FINDINGS 
The findings are summarised in figure 5.5 below 
Figure 5.5: key findings 
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5.3 CONCEPTION OF CONFLICT 
Figure 5.6 shows the model of conflict as derived from the responses of the 
participants.  
 
Figure 5.6: Conception of conflict 
The response from AM revealed that conflict can be best understood as a conflict cycle 
which starts with failed attempts to prevent conflict. He said; 
We have what we call the Conflict Cycle. We actually see that we might start 
with some negotiations. We put up some institutions then we also try to reach 
appoint where we can also try and engage the warring parties so that they can  
tolerate each other and resolve that conflict in a more sustainable manner. So 
resolution is now something which actually comes after a conflict has erupted. 
So there is conflict prevention and also conflict resolution. Resolution actually 
comes you have failed to prevent the conflict. Conflict would have erupted and 
you now want to find solutions to that kind of conflict that would have emerged. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\AM> - § 1 reference coded [4.20% Coverage] 
As indicated by AM, the cycle starts with conflict, this conflict was largely understood 
by many (13) as conflicting interests and ideologies. The following text query revealed 
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that conflict was understood as a clash, disagreements differences in ideologies, 
sentiments, views, etc. 
 
Figure 5.7: Query for ideology 
As revealed by JN, conflict of interests and ideologies could be said to be brewed by 
deficiency. She said; 
conflict is, any situation that gives rise to unrest in a community or society. It 
could be triggered by issues such as lack of resources, different ideologies, 
whether they are economic or political….they are not sufficiently and decisively 
resolved, they can lead to deep rooted conflict which can lead to civil unrest. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\JN> - § 2 references coded [3.17% Coverage] 
This deficiency would then lead to the competition that MD and SM alluded to: 
Conflict…are problems that arises when different people or groups compete for 
certain resources…or they compete for…lets say for example power. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\MD> - § 1 reference coded [2.87% Coverage] 
contest between people of ideas <Internals\\transcripts\\SM> - § 1 reference 
coded  [0.19% Coverage] 
 
So basically conflict can arise from deficiency which might motivate people to 
compete. As shown in the figure above there is an association between competition 
and deficiencies although these could cause conflict of interests on their own. The 
cycle of conflict would not be complete without the resolution side. 
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Figure 5.8 
The syntheses of the responses reveal that conflict resolution was perceived as a 
reaction of failure to prevent manifest conflict; 
Resolution actually comes you have failed to prevent the conflict. Conflict would 
have erupted and you now want to find solutions to that kind of conflict that 
would have emerged.<Internals\\transcripts\\AM> - § 1 reference coded [1.19% 
Coverage] 
Conflict resolution is those approaches that are designed to deflect those issues 
that I have stated to be drivers of conflict, to deflate arguments at community 
and national level to ensure that it doesn’t escalate to a full scale in a way that 
will destabilise the community<Internals\\transcripts\\JN> - § 1 reference coded  
[2.71% Coverage] 
These reactions are mitigatory in nature; 
talking about ways and means to mitigate and how best to resolve a conflict 
that has arisen between two or more parties...<Internals\\transcripts\\GB> - § 1 
reference coded  [2.11% Coverage] 
This mitigation would have a pacification effect in which the potential harm is reduced, 
averted, ignored, rectified, etc 
Conflict resolution is the attempt to pacify the confrontation between these two 
parties or adversaries.<Internals\\transcripts\\KC> - § 1 reference coded 
[1.48% Coverage] 
signing of treaties forgiveness <Internals\\transcripts\\GB> - § 1 reference 
coded  [0.22% Coverage] 
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measures that are taken to rectify or to reduce bad things that could happen as 
result of conflict.<Internals\\transcripts\\MD> - § 1 reference coded  [1.70% 
Coverage] 
Pacification would then bring peace and settle disputes as shown in the search query 
below. 
 
Figure 5.9 
The settling of the dispute might mean that the ground has been made even or the 
common ground has been found.  
two parties which will be in conflict are supposed to find common ground and 
at the end of the day create a situation whereby each can achieve their 
objectives without compromising the objectives of the 
other<Internals\\transcripts\\TD> - § 1 reference coded  [1.63% Coverage] 
‘what is the best hope of us getting to a situation where we agree’. So you are 
on A and I am on B, maybe we have to meet half way or I have to come on your 
way so we have to have understanding first.<Internals\\transcripts\\VM> - § 1 
reference coded  [3.59% Coverage] 
Negotiations…round table <Internals\\transcripts\\GB> - § 2 references coded 
[0.16% Coverage] 
how to reduce or to curb completely these 
differences<Internals\\transcripts\\TC> - § 1 reference coded  [0.68% 
Coverage] 
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5.4 ADEQUACY OF LOCAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
Adequacy was explored in relation to management of conflict by local authorities, 
adequacy of the institutions and the relationship with the INGOs.  
 
Figure 5.10: Adequacy of local conflict resolution. 
5.5 MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT BY LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
AUTHORITIES 
Generally, the majority of the respondents decried that the management of conflict by 
local authorities were inadequate. As shown in Figure 5.11 below, the divide line 
between adequacy and inadequacy shows that most of the codes were mostly for 
inadequacy.  
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Figure 5.11: Management of conflict by local institutions and authorities.  
Although fewer, some felt that adequate structures exist and are being managed well.  
As it regards to adequacy of management of conflicts by local authorities and 
institutions, I wouldn’t say to a greater extent that these conflict are being 
resolved adequately. Why do I say so? Yes, we have local authorities who are 
very much engaged in trying to resolve the conflicts that 
arise<Internals\\transcripts\\SM> - § 1 reference coded [1.80% Coverage] 
Yes, I can say these conflicts are being managed by Zimbabwean institutions 
to some extent, for example the local courts…Most of these conflicts ultimately 
can be referred to the courts and our courts have to greater extent have 
managed to resolve these conflicts.<Internals\\transcripts\\TC> - § 2 references 
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coded  [3.37% Coverage] 
Yes, I do believe that conflicts in Zimbabwe, they are being managed and 
well<Internals\\transcripts\\MD> - § 1 reference coded [0.94% Coverage] 
Of these structures, the judicial system was the most cited, followed by the Organ on 
national healing and reconciliation. Churches, ministries and ZIM-Asset were the other 
structured revealed to exist.  
The judicial institutions were said to be functional and adequate by some participants 
 
Figure 5.12 
This support is shown below 
Although we should not forget that there are other institutions like the Judicial 
institutions that are put in place legally to solve conflicts in Zimbabwe be it civil 
cases, criminal cases and other level of cases that happen in Zimbabwe, like 
they need to be tabled maybe at high court or various levels like magistrate 
courts. <Internals\\transcripts\\GB> - § 1 reference coded [3.23% Coverage] 
I can say they are adequately being resolved because in Zimbabwe we have 
got institutions set by government which deal with conflict resolution. It starts at 
village level where we have village head arbitrating over families. It cascade to 
ward and district level until provincial and even national. We have got law 
enforcement agents which also help in conflict 
resolution.<Internals\\transcripts\\KC> - § 1 reference coded [5.38% Coverage] 
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Yes, I can say these conflicts are being managed by Zimbabwean institutions 
to some extent, for example the local courts…Most of these conflicts ultimately 
can be referred to the courts and our courts have to greater extent have 
managed to resolve these conflicts.<Internals\\transcripts\\TC> - § 2 references 
coded  [3.37% Coverage] 
There are various support institutions that are there starting from the bottom of 
the pyramid. Even in the rural areas we have local institutions like the kraal 
head, the headsman. The traditional chiefs that are there to resolve problems 
that might have arisen from maybe the local communities. At national level we 
do have law enforcement agencies like the police, that’s what I 
think.<Internals\\transcripts\\MD> - § 1 reference coded [4.70% Coverage] 
I think they are being managed adequately by institutions such as court 
system…They are doing their best.<Internals\\transcripts\\SN> - § 2 references 
coded [1.87% Coverage] 
Yes, because we have an arm of government which deals with conflicts, the 
local courts, but there are also other techniques set up to try and resolve those 
disputes in an out of court settlement such as 
arbitration.<Internals\\transcripts\\SZ> - § 1 reference coded  [3.26% Coverage] 
Maybe that can be seen with traditional means, litigious approaches, the courts, 
conflicts…you can see even political parties, they go to courts to address their 
conflicts<Internals\\transcripts\\TD> - § 1 reference coded  [1.61% Coverage] 
The Organ on National Healing and Reconciliation was also thought to be helping;  
In trying to resolve some of the conflicts that exist, the Global Political Agreement 
article 7 actually created an organ which they call the Organ on National Healing, 
Reconciliation and Integration which mandated the government to deal with issues of 
national unity and cohesion. It tasked three Ministers from the GNU to deal with these 
issues but as though trying to deal with these issues, there are still many other issues 
that they must resolve. For example, you find that there are many sources of conflict; 
political competition like one witnessed between MDCs and ZANU PF 
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parties.<Internals\\transcripts\\SM> - § 1 reference coded [3.58% Coverage] 
We have Organ on National Healing and Reconciliation, and other 
NGOs.<Internals\\transcripts\\SN> - § 1 reference coded [1.23% Coverage] 
And then the mere existence of the organ of reconciliation and integration is also a 
sign that there are efforts towards addressing conflicts in Zimbabwe. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\TD> - § 1 reference coded [1.21% Coverage] 
However, in as much as the judicial institutions and the commission, among other 
mechanisms, have been stated, the majority largely decried that the management and 
structures are not only inadequate but also inappropriate. Generally, the judicial 
institutions that others feel are adequate and working well, the others (6) felt that 
people have lost confidence with the courts.  
Nodes compare by number of items coded 
 
Figure 5.13: Decried Inadequacy 
59 
 
Failure of neutrality, bribery, delayed resolutions and shortage of courts are the 
reasons given for the lost confidence. Equally, the Organ on National Healing and 
Reconciliation that was said to be helpful was said to have died with the GNU. GB 
said; 
So institutions, for example the Organ of National Healing that was inaugurated 
after the government of national unity which was meant to bring harmony in the 
country. I think in my own understanding it did a thorough job but it died when 
the GNU also lapsed in its term <Internals\\transcripts\\GB> - § 1 reference 
coded [1.92% Coverage] 
Apart from its death with GNU, some felt that it was not equal to the task. They felt 
that it was but just in mere existence and its efficiency needs scrutiny. JN and TD had 
this to say; 
National Peace and Reconciliation Commission was to address issue of past 
and present conflict. How effectively that was done I think it’s something that 
needs to be investigated. Research needs to be done and I am sure that even 
as we speak, there are some who have tried to analyse the work of that 
Commission. The purpose or objectives of that Commission are to redress 
issues of conflict. How far back in history they are likely to go and issues that 
will take prominence…I think the fact that we have the Commission is a 
testimony that we have deep seated conflicts among people and those conflicts 
have caused much destabilisation between rich and poor, black and white. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\JN> - § 1 reference coded [7.26% Coverage] 
And then the mere existence of the organ of reconciliation and integration is 
also a sign that there are efforts towards addressing conflicts in Zimbabwe. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\TD> - § 1 reference coded [1.21% Coverage] 
The conflict resolution was also largely decried as being politicised as they reveal that 
political affiliation would determine the decision.  
you have your traditional leaders and your local leaders who under normal 
circumstance are supposed to be neutral in conflict resolution, but what we then 
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tend to see in Zimbabwe is a situation whereby the different disciplines have 
been subordinated by politics in Zimbabwe. At the end of the day, it becomes a 
matter of political affiliation that influences how a matter is to be decided. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\GM> - § 1 reference coded [3.88% Coverage] 
Some of those constraints may even be the issue of resource then the issue of 
the politics involved.<Internals\\transcripts\\HZ> - § 1 reference coded [1.08% 
Coverage] 
Local authorities still have a greater bargaining power, so there is no even 
platform in terms of how the conflicts will be resolved. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\MP> - § 1 reference coded [6.21% Coverage] 
The problem is that we have two clashing parties, in their interests, there is 
always the weaker part and there is always the stronger part. The stronger part 
normally holds a position somewhere somehow within the ruling class. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\PB> - § 1 reference coded [3.49% Coverage] 
The local institutions are not managing to resolve political issues because there 
is political bias. Most of the presiding officers are directly appointed and they 
have a bias towards the government <Internals\\transcripts\\TC> - § 1 reference 
coded [2.52% Coverage] 
I don’t think we are doing enough for that because people are either this side 
or that side and they tend not to meet half way and that’s a fundamental problem 
we have in Zimbabwe.<Internals\\transcripts\\VM> - § 1 reference coded  
[8.86% Coverage] 
So it seems the decision is based on the political camp to which you belong. To this, 
others also felt that the terrain for settling political disputes is highly rough; 
about political conflicts as a country that we are currently facing between the 
two belligerent parties, the Zanu PF party and the MDC formations that are 
fighting for supremacy in Zimbabwe. So now regarding how these conflicts are 
being resolved, I think in Zimbabwe the terrain is quite rough and rugged and 
it’s not even conducive for the conflict resolution mechanism to be fully 
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implemented to come up with an amicable situation. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\GB> - § 1 reference coded [3.09% Coverage] 
AM felt that the stance taken by ZANU PF was insufficient for the status quo and the 
conflicts are now too big for resolution with the local institutions; 
ZAPU-ZANU conflict and how it was resolved. It was more of local people, you 
know, Zimbabwean institutions that resolved that kind of problem. Then if we 
also want to take for example, the conflicts that happened from the 2000 period 
again up to the escalation of the election related disputes like the violent 2008, 
we actually see that Zimbabwe has some past or history of conflicts. They 
actually take some leaf or lessons from that kind of conflict resolution 
mechanism to say that it is the local people who are supposed to own that 
process and when they own that process, they actually come up with some 
solutions which are more sustainable to that conflict. So yes, they have actually 
tried to put priority first to the local institutions to say that these are Zimbabwean 
problems, hence we just need to find some Zimbabwean solutions to that 
problem. So this has been the stance that has been taken by the Zanu PF 
government….They have also tried to incorporate when they also reached 
some kind of agreement with, for example, the MDC formations to say that we 
are Zimbabweans and we need to come up with some solutions that suit the 
interests of the country. But we also see that other external partners or 
stakeholders again have also been involved in the process to actually make it 
more inclusive so that the interests of the majority can actually be captured so 
that we have some sort of stability within Zimbabwe. So I actually believe that 
in the first instance the local institutions have also tried to play a role and also 
the local Zimbabweans themselves have also played the greater part to try and 
find some kind of tolerance and peaceful resolutions to those problems that 
would have emanated. <Internals\\transcripts\\AM> - § 2 references coded 
[11.42% Coverage] 
As insinuated by AM above, the existence and involvement of the external conflict 
resolution was also revealed as indicative of insufficiency of our local conflict 
resolutions. GC also reasoned that there are other conflicts whose resource demands 
are beyond what we can supply; 
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When we resolve conflict, it also needs our friends and other helpers to make 
us reach a point of settlement. Yes, we do have issues that are being settled 
locally but we also have issues that also need the intervention of outsider from 
our borders… If we look at the period from 2008 when the institutions such as 
SADC had to intervene to help the political parties and the Zimbabwean in 
general reach a political settlement on the contentious issues of power. This is 
a situation where we saw the outsiders coming to help… Given the 
circumstances of that period and also what came out afterwards, I think it was 
a process which was adequate in the sense that it was specific to that 
settlement of that dispute on the political parties because we ended up having 
a GNU which helped to stabilize and make foes work together as friends, which 
I think was never heard of given that the political parties that were involved we 
diametrically opposed to each other to such an extent no one thought that they 
would ever come together. With the intervention of SADC, we saw some 
settlement. <Internals\\transcripts\\GC> - § 3 references coded [12.63% 
Coverage] 
EM also felt that is insufficient given the pending and unresolved land conflicts. The 
reasoning is that the resolutions are in suspense and infamous.  
You can think about the land conflicts. Yes people have been given land but 
there are still many people who need land. Often there is an argument that the 
policy itself benefited those that did not deserve. <Internals\\transcripts\\EM> - 
§ 1 reference coded [2.03% Coverage] 
Augmenting the problem, maybe it’s the paranoid censorship given to INGOs by the 
government as insinuated by EK below.  
Christian Care used to give aid to the underprivileged. They used to face a 
problem as if they were used by the opposition parties. The ruling party being 
the one in power would overpower these food aid organizations like Christian 
Care. <Internals\\transcripts\\EK> - § 1 reference coded [6.36% Coverage] 
The land issue could be reasoned to be a resolution strategy that caused a vicious 
circle of conflict. To this and related socio-economic concomitants, INGOs came to try 
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and address the conflicts that erupted from the eruption of the land reform conflict 
resolution strategy. In so doing again they just arch themselves in the vicious circle of 
conflict as they are now at loggerheads with ruling party.  
5.5.1 Adequacy of local conflict resolution institutions 
As shown above on the management, deficiency was the common talk among the 
respondents. Therefore, it would not be a surprise that the adequacy section is 
significantly smaller than the inadequacy. In most cases, during the 1990s and before, 
the institutions were receiving donor support. Later on, there was a shift in the global 
focus of funding. The tree map below, highlights the responses. 
 
Figure 5.14: Adequacy of local conflict resolution institutions 
Even the majority of those who felt that the resources are adequate; they also felt that 
the institutions lack effective utility. However, most of the participant shared the pie of 
inadequacy as they decry of partisan judicial institutions, corrupt security sector, 
inefficient Anti-corruption commission, unequipped Human rights commission, lack of 
independent eyes, lack of reforms, inefficient institutions and the ‘players who are 
referees’ in the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission which is defunct.  
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5.5.2 INGOs-Local conflict management institution relations 
 
Figure 5.15: NGOs-Local conflict management institution relations 
The political strand is the main relational context that seems to determine the affect 
and emotion of the relationship. Political-apolitical continuum comes in handy in which 
the bias towards the former is highly volatile and the later if joyous.   
If the local conflict management institution perceives the INGO as assuming a political 
intent, the relations would go volatile;  
To some extent, they might also not be viewed as partners if they are politically 
biased towards certain political parties. This distorts their perceptions simply 
because of their past operations. <Internals\\transcripts\\AM> - § 1 reference 
coded [1.31% Coverage] 
There are those who fund the so called opposition within Zimbabwe…They try 
to influence the process so their aims can be realized… Again, we have to 
segment again. With those that are alleged to fund the opposition, the 
relationship is tense. But with the other NGOs, the relationship is 
good.<Internals\\transcripts\\GC> - § 3 references coded [3.40% Coverage] 
The bias and funding of certain political parties and opposition politics is the major 
source of distrust.  
There was need to assess organisations in order to determine their political activism 
so that those found to be neutral could be left to do their programmes. The neutral 
ones would be grouped as “apolitical”. These were conceptualized as able to 
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contribute to the provision of resources to support peace building mechanisms. The 
views are as follows; 
Then there are those who come and try to resolve the conflict. So I think we 
should see the difference… But those that are genuine want to see peace and 
stability in Zimbabwe. They want to see development progressing from a 
transitional state to a fully democratic state that can contribute to its citizens 
and also to the international family of nations.<Internals\\transcripts\\GC> - § 2 
references coded [4.13% Coverage] 
The local institutions again, you also see that to some extent they also view 
these INGOs as partners when we are resolving some kind of conflicts. For 
example if they want to do some outreach programmes, INGOs can also play 
apart by providing some kind of resources to also support those kind of 
campaigns to be done within the country.  
If they are doing them in an objective manner, these institutions are welcome 
and taken as workable partners to resolve conflicts or to come up with some 
mechanisms that will bring about lasting peace and stability within the 
country.<Internals\\transcripts\\AM> - § 2 references coded  [3.81% Coverage] 
Well, I think the relationship is good but it’s in two forms or there are imperatives 
that we can put across. If it is the government, it’s a national NGO relationship; 
it’s a little bit sour and also intimate in some instances. You think about the 
government when it established the three institutions that contributed towards 
political stability, we have the JOMIC, Organ on National Healing Reconciliation 
and Integration, as well as COPAC. They were virtually supported by UNDP 
and other consortium funders. So in that case you can see that the relation is 
positive because the government actually accepted this fact by working 
together with them. Today we have got ZUNDAF; it also provides support to the 
government’s efforts. It’s one government work programme which it is working 
with, together with the UNDP. When it come to the relationship between the 
local civic society conflict mechanisms and the international organizations, I 
guess it’s also positive, given that it’s the local people who have founded local 
organizations and who are implementing local conflict management 
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mechanisms. Giving example, if we have youth organizations that use 
traditional mechanisms of resolving conflicts using dialogue and economic 
empowered mechanisms like livelihoods support systems; they reduce 
conflicts. As long as people are able to meet their basic needs, there is 
likelihood of less conflict, hence contributing towards peace and tranquility in 
the country. <Internals\\transcripts\\EM> - § 1 reference coded [14.47% 
Coverage] 
The main question is to how independent are these INGOs from political intent. EM 
indicated that most of the political conflict resolution institutions are funded by INGOs. 
How significantly independent are these from funding the intents of opposition politics? 
5.6 EXISTENCE OF INGOS' INFLUENCE ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
5.6.1 Type of INGOs' influence on conflict resolution 
The type of influence was revealed to be largely political which might be under the 
pretext of humanitarian interventions or as open as supporting political parties, regime 
change agents or direct political publicity. However, a few others felt that their 
involvement is inextricably linked to all issues in the mediation between the 
government and the people. The social, economic involvements were marginally 
revealed as most felt that the political was the most dominant type of or intention of 
involvement even in those socio-economic activities.  
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Figure 5.16: INGOs' influence on conflict resolution 
The political banner is well explored in the following query below in Figure 5.17  This 
query was done as a simultaneous query for ‘social, economic and political’ and 
spontaneously ‘political was the main descriptor that was centralised and the other two 
are only inserted as peripherals.  The dominance of political involvement is 
unquestionable.  
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Figure 5.17  
The political involvement was mostly said to be under the pretext of humanitarian aid; 
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So in that aspect, they have got that ideological and political orientation 
regardless of the fact that one NGO might want to come with some economic 
initiative…humanitarian intervention… The government would actually say that 
people were being given that humanitarian assistance on condition that they 
would vote for a certain political party. In that aspect it actually distorted the 
whole issues and perceptions about these INGOs. That’s how the issues now 
turned to be more political rather than social and economic. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\AM> - § 3 references coded [3.41% Coverage] 
There also even direct funding that’s coming from foreign organizations to 
different implementing partners in the local scene. Examples are awash; 
Zimbabwe has Human Rights Lawyers Association which is there to congentise 
the public on their rights and how to demand their rights from the government.  
Examples also include National Constitutional Assembly which advocated for 
recognition of people’s constitutional rights and make people agitate for a new 
constitution. <Internals\\transcripts\\GM> - § 1 reference coded [4.52% 
Coverage] 
I would say it’s political to some extent.  This is because of the funding issue. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\HK> - § 1 reference coded [1.72% Coverage] 
Recently I the development donors have been coming on board mainly on 
political reasons to the extent that the government has developed these 
guidelines giving a clear platform that when the development partners want to 
come they should clearly state what they want to do. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\MD> - § 1 reference coded [3.35% Coverage] 
When these NGOs penetrate into a country, obviously they say they have a 
genuine reason like they are seeing violation of human rights. It’s now up to the 
observer who may deem that as a political move or gimmick of some sort. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\SZ> - § 1 reference coded [3.42% Coverage] 
Political, we can take a NGO here in Zimbabwe, for example the one that has 
closed, the NCA. This NCA has been seen trying to push for a new constitution. 
This NCA is funded by INGOs. So politically they are trying shape the new 
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constitution for the country. That becomes the political 
influence.<Internals\\transcripts\\TC> - § 1 reference coded [3.77% Coverage] 
But in that economic mode, there are now political issues because when money 
is given, they also expect that your reports are supposed to be in line with their 
own policies in terms of conflict resolution.<Internals\\transcripts\\TD> - § 1 
reference coded  [1.61% Coverage] 
5.6.2 Evaluation of influence from INGOs 
The existence of the INGOs’ influence was largely viewed as inevitable as these 
INGOs are the transnationalising agents in the global village. Figure 5.18 below shows 
that while their intent could be reasoned to be largely for regulation and giving impetus 
to the conflict management in the global village, they were largely construed as fronts 
of the governments from which they emanated from. As a result they were viewed as, 
under the pretext of funding and humanitarian work, pushing the agenda of their 
respective masters as a result they will appear in the form of dogs and yet they are 
toothless. The perception of this intent would lead the discourse on regime change 
versus resolution intentions. To that end, the INGO would then be caught in the vicious 
circle of conflict as it is interpreted as an aggressor in a sheep’s clothing.   
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Figure 5.18 
The pretext of funding was revealed in the following extracts: 
Yes, the influence is there from INGOs. These INGOs are funded from outside 
eg, DFID, USAID. Definitely these organizations further the interests of their 
mother countries. Currently, I am serving on the education desk, I was working 
on the BEAM programme and the DFID and other chief donors simply decided 
that this is not the best way education assistance should be expended to the 
underprivileged. There was a lot of resources they thought were believed to be 
lost along the channel to the central government. They were saying we want a 
rights-based approach but we know this is an agenda being pushed by the 
Western countries. So what they are funding right now is giving grants to 
schools so that they capacitate themselves. This has created conflict with the 
government. <Internals\\transcripts\\GM> - § 1 reference coded [7.51% 
Coverage] 
The definition of INGOs in my view means institutions that are not local but 
operate across borders. In Zimbabwe, I am not really sure if we can say 
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international institutions are they influencing peace or conflict issues given that 
most of them are funders rather than operators. They deal with local NGOs. So 
at a higher level, we can say they are influencing if they are in the form of 
funding rather than operation themselves. <Internals\\transcripts\\EM> - § 1 
reference coded [4.28% Coverage] 
I would say yes to some extent especially when it comes to the funding. I think 
some of these INGOs fund some conflict resolution mechanisms in Zimbabwe. 
Usually when someone funds you, sometimes you have to play the tune 
according to the piper.<Internals\\transcripts\\HK> - § 1 reference coded [5.03% 
Coverage] 
There is somehow especially on the funding part of it. Well, because the 
involved institutions may not be fully supported in terms of resources which are 
too lean in bringing conflict resolution to realization. So they need the 
intervention of another hand especially to assist in meeting the costs that are 
involved in delivering on their mandates. <Internals\\transcripts\\HZ> - § 1 
reference coded  [3.77% Coverage] 
The problem would then because conflict, maybe much worse than the one they 
intended to solve. A BEAM program would erupt in an international dispute because 
DFID would be perceived to be following the agenda of the Western countries.  
The INGOs appear to be passively and indirectly involved in conflict resolution.  
I think it’s… indirectly. I am however not sure whether NGOs are taking part in 
capacitating our institutions that are engaged in conflict resolution. We can take 
it also from the perspective that there are various conflicts, some of which are 
social. When somebody comes and they engage you in different sets of 
programmes that alone may be an indirect way of addressing or maybe 
blocking the emergence of conflict. <Internals\\transcripts\\LM> - § 1 reference 
coded [7.04% Coverage] 
I think the influence might be there and I think it could be not that much direct. 
I think it could be indirect… I think it’s difficult to separate because there are 
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various development partners that are maybe supported by foreign 
governments. I think an element of influence could come on board maybe 
indirectly, not necessarily directly. I understand that recently the government of 
Zimbabwe has given these foreign development partners a guide to clearly 
state what they want to do. <Internals\\transcripts\\MD> - § 2 references coded 
[5.93% Coverage] 
Could it be possible that this passivity is a calculated strategy intended to yield other 
hidden produce? There are cases in which the ZANU PF and/or government bcame 
very suspicious of the INGOs to the extent that it would associate them with regime 
change agendas is it regime change or resolution? Figure 5.19 below shows a query 
that shows there the government is very alert and actively sensor for regime change 
agendas.  
 
Figure 5.19 
AM and MP revealed that its Zanu PF point of view that is emphasising that viewpoint 
so that it would feel safe or de-campaign opposition politics; 
On that aspect of the influence, to some extent in Zimbabwe, we can actually 
see that issues to do with conflicts have also involved for example the non 
governmental organizations, civil society but we also see that the influence now 
74 
 
depends on where you are standing from. If we are to look at the Zanu PF point 
of view, they actually view for example these NGOs and all these civil society 
as regime change agents. So in that aspect we actually see that they have got 
a cautious approach when they are dealing with international non governmental 
organizations and when they are also dealing with the civil society which they 
might think that it is more or less the sympathizers of the opposition parties. So 
that kind of bias or polarization within the country has actually distorted again 
the effectiveness or the operations of the international non governmental 
organizations with regards to conflicts. <Internals\\transcripts\\AM> - § 1 
reference coded [6.07% Coverage] 
To some extent, there is some influence in NGOs in the sense that there are 
some NGOs which advocate for some changes or some human rights or some 
changes in how institutions are currently being run.<Internals\\transcripts\\MP> 
- § 1 reference coded  [3.30% Coverage] 
However, the inherent truth, or lack of, in these accusations had caused, as AM said, 
polarization within the country and has actually distorted the effectiveness or the 
operations of the INGOs with regards to conflict resolutions. Often they will be caught 
in the vicious circle of conflict;  
I can say yes because you see that these conflicts, when they arise, most of 
them are being generated by these NGOs. Why? Because when it comes to 
the issues of rights, these NGOs will be lobbying for human rights to the people. 
So these organizations will push the government to put some laws that are 
favourable to the people or some laws that give human rights to the people than 
taking them from people. They want to see the results at the end of each 
hearing that is politically sensitive.<Internals\\transcripts\\TC> - § 1 reference 
coded [6.35% Coverage] 
Of course what we have found is that it depends on who funds those NGOs so 
they have got a particular position in Zimbabwe. Whatever they do has to be in 
line with that position which might not make them to be effective in Zimbabwe. 
So there might be a conflict of motives.<Internals\\transcripts\\VM> - § 1 
reference coded [4.98% Coverage] 
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There was a lot of resources they thought were believed to be lost along the 
channel to the central government… this is an agenda being pushed by the 
Western countries. So what they are funding right now is giving grants to 
schools so that they capacitate themselves. This has created conflict with the 
government.<Internals\\transcripts\\GM> - § 1 reference coded [3.61% 
Coverage] 
5.6.3 Influence of Britain on conflict resolution 
As coming from the data, the model below shows the influence of Britain on the conflict 
resolution in Zimbabwe.  
 
Figure 5.20 
Broadly speaking, the influence was found to be structurally different according to the 
present and the past. The past and present relations between Zimbabwe and Britain 
seemed to sharply shape the way Zimbabwe interact and discernment the INGOs. 
Looking in the past, it was revealed that there was a time when the relationship 
between Zimbabwe and Britain was amicable and as a result the interaction between 
Zimbabwe’s relations to INGOs was also socio-economically favourable. However, the 
present situation seems to be an Era of strong opposition and the relation with INGOs 
turned politically sour.  
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Looking at the past, the Lancaster House Agreement was said to have been an 
attempt to settle conflict. SM reasoned that it was (also) Britain’s intention to try to 
resolve the dispute; 
Positively, you also remember that during the colonial era, Zimbabwe did not 
get it’s freedom simply by fighting. We all know that it was through the Lancaster 
House Agreement that later gave cessation to the hostilities that existed 
between the settlerists that were here and the nationalist freedom fighters. So 
we can actually scan back then, we can even see Britain’s hand in trying to 
resolve the conflict that existed in Zimbabwe.<Internals\\transcripts\\SM> - § 1 
reference coded [2.65% Coverage] 
Such a settlement of conflict gave birth to the ‘Tea with the Queen Era’ and ‘Merits 
and the Awards Era’ in which Britain was supporting economically to address some 
socio-economic conflicts;  
From 1980 maybe to late 1990s, the relationship that existed between Harare 
and London, I think in my own understanding it was quite interesting in that we 
saw the Prime Minister was travelling to have tea with the queen. He was given 
some merits and the awards, being a gentleman. All those few aspects will tell 
you that the relationship was good and there was more funding to government 
programmes and initiatives…So in most cases, during the 1990s, 1980s, they 
were supporting economically. Later on, they are funding more to do with the 
human rights as if in the 80s there were no rights. <Internals\\transcripts\\GB> 
- § 2 references coded [4.20% Coverage] 
GB’s allusions to transition from economic to human rights issues could be indicative 
of transition in the Eras from ‘Tea with the Queen Era’ to ‘Era of strong opposition’ 
demarcating the present from the past. This opposition could be said to be too 
irrational and subjective since they were said to be opposing anything the other does 
and exchange hate speeches.  
The bilateral relations between Zimbabwe and Britain are sour relations and 
there has been no thaw for at least a decade. To date there are somehow 
sporadic efforts to mend relations and build bridges. To date we can’t say there 
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is any relationship to talk about other than trading of hate speeches 
<Internals\\transcripts\\HZ> - § 1 reference coded [3.18% Coverage] 
Basing on Mugabe’s negative remarks on Britain, one can deduce that the 
relationship is sour…I can quote the President saying, ‘Keep your Britain and I 
will keep my Zimbabwe”<Internals\\transcripts\\SN> - § 2 references coded 
[3.16% Coverage] 
By coming in now late 1990s, 98, 99, 2000 until there now, the relationship has 
been quite appalling, deteriorating and quite sour, associated with hatred, 
acrimony and suspicion in terms of running the government. We now see 
London is no longer interested in Harare affairs but it is located on the extreme 
side of opposing whatever is transpiring in Harare. <Internals\\transcripts\\GB> 
- § 1 reference coded [2.56% Coverage] 
It’s even surprising that we still have the Zimbabwe embassy in UK. To me, 
that’s very artificial. The relationship has since broken down since the 
Zimbabwe land reform programme. We are always trading accusations and 
counter-accusations up until Britain and its foreign partners have imposed 
sanctions to Zimbabwe. <Internals\\transcripts\\GM> - § 1 reference coded 
[3.04% Coverage] 
The present relational context is summarised in the grounded model below in figure 
5.21 
78 
 
 
Figure 5.21: Present relational context 
The strong opposition started with the renegaded compensation of the land reform; 
Zimbabwe maintains diplomatic relations with its former colonizer. 
Unfortunately, the labour government of Tony Blair was not as rich the 
conservatives. They renegaded on the issue of compensating Zimbabwe for 
land reforms and that soured relations, up to now those relations are still 
sour.<Internals\\transcripts\\KC> - § 1 reference coded  [4.20% Coverage] 
The British were not happy by being chased away especially from their farms. 
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Before the land reforms, the relations were good. The problems emerged with 
land reform where the majority of Zimbabwean was reclaiming their land. The 
relations are similar to that of INGO-local government relations. Britain and 
INGOs’ perceptions are still the same. Internals\\transcripts\\TC> - § 1 
reference coded [4.40% Coverage] 
They have been frosty, simply because of the issue of the land. You know how 
Mugabe has taken one stand and there is an accusation that they made 
promises that they did not meet. So there is that anger from our side. The British 
feel that they did not have an obligation. <Internals\\transcripts\\VM> - § 1 
reference coded [4.92% Coverage] 
At this juncture, some of the participants felt that in the name of EU Britain was 
engaging with Zimbabwe on economic ground but with intention of reaping political 
results.  
The influence as it is with EU, it is just economic on the ground and then political 
at the end of it. It’s economic but with politics behind in terms of policies and 
guidelines of how conflicts are supposed to be managed according to the EU 
which is funding our Organ here in Zimbabwe.<Internals\\transcripts\\TD> - § 1 
reference coded [2.27% Coverage] 
Some believed that Britain, by its past, its associated with Zimbabwe. As a result it 
would like to protect its image and interest but its now using the face of EU to achive 
its subjective interests in Zimbabwe;  
Absolutely, I think the British still have a vested interest in Zimbabwe although 
they don’t come out. This country was a colony and they invested a lot. To date 
I think they feel that this country has gone to the dogs and they wouldn’t want 
to be associated with that. So they must try to influence positive 
change.<Internals\\transcripts\\VM> - § 1 reference coded [5.75% Coverage] 
Therefore EU is the mask; 
Yes, in terms of Britain as a former colony and it being a part to the EU which 
is currently funding conflict resolution in Zimbabwe, it means Britain has a hand 
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and it being a major player in the European Union there it means it has got a 
role to play in terms of influencing but maybe with a hidden hand in the name 
of the European Union but it has got a hand. <Internals\\transcripts\\TD> - § 1 
reference coded [2.83% Coverage] 
but maybe the EU could have influence not British government on its own… 
Recently there was some effort by the EU to influence so peace commissions 
that were supposed to be established in Zimbabwe. They put some conditions 
to be adopted before they support the peace 
commissions<Internals\\transcripts\\SN> - § 2 references coded [4.99% 
Coverage] 
Through the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act, British used the EU 
to lobby for the sanctions to advance the British’s interests in Zimbabwe: 
Britain has on the other hand caused conflict in Zimbabwe, eg on the land issue. 
We all know that Zimbabwe and Britain had entered into an agreement where 
the British government was going to buy land and compensate its farmers. But 
you remember the issue of Claireshot who directly rejected the agreement 
saying she had nothing to do with it. This precipitated, according to the ruling 
party, the land grab that took place in Zimbabwe. Some would want to call it it 
a chaotic process and I believe it was so. So, it was again a cause of conflict. 
Those people believe in the philosophy of injure-one-injure-all. The Zimbabwe 
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act which was penned by the Washington 
Administration was a response to these injustices which they thought had been 
perpetrated against their kith and kin, the British according to the ruling party’s 
propaganda, I might say these are not my personal views. Basically as you see, 
it’s another way that has also caused conflict because the USA was responding 
to grievances coming from the British. We had sanctions being imposed. We 
saw the EU following suit… British government lobbying USA, Germany and all 
others to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe.<Internals\\transcripts\\SM> - § 2 
references coded [7.28% Coverage] 
We have got many issues that haven’t been resolved, like the government still 
blames the British for all the sufferings that the people of Zimbabwe are going 
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through even as it emanates from sanctions imposed, the British government 
lobbying USA, Germany and all others to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\SM> - § 1 reference coded [1.84% Coverage] 
Viewing from the point that Britain had a hand in the imposition of sanctions in 
Zimbabwe. <Internals\\transcripts\\SN> - § 1 reference coded [1.60% 
Coverage] 
having been imposed by Britain and also in the auspices of the 
EU.<Internals\\transcripts\\TD> - § 1 reference coded  [0.52% Coverage] 
put sanctions on Zimbabwe, so the economic quagmire that Zimbabwe is 
currently finding itself in is attributed to sanctions. Obviously it cannot positively 
conflict resolution in Zimbabwe in any way.<Internals\\transcripts\\SZ> - § 1 
reference coded [2.96% Coverage] 
Some also believe that the British sought to create its own islands in Zimbabwe 
through the support of other political parties and the funding through other British 
INGOs working in Zimbabwe.  
But if it does in many ways maybe it’s because we are leaving in a heavily 
politically contested terrain. So I would say that the position that Britain holds in 
trying to solve conflict is through maybe supporting opposition parties. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\GB> - § 1 reference coded [1.66% Coverage] 
look at the cases like Britain being accused of funding opposition political 
parties which to some extent causes conflicts with the ruling part, there is that 
perception by the ruling party which then causes misunderstanding. So I would 
say it has some influence.1 <Internals\\transcripts\\HK> - § 1 reference coded 
[5.31% Coverage] 
The support of opposition politics could end the situation in the vicious circle of conflict 
again as the ruling party would feel the confrontation.  
The funding from British INGOs was also mentioned. 
82 
 
I cannot say Britain interfered in Zimbabwe’s conflict resolution except through 
organizations such as OXFAM and others in order to try and influence the 
political thinking of Zimbabweans. Recently they were saying they imposed 
sanctions on Zimbabwe but they have been channeling money in Zimbabwe. 
But that money was only being channeled through NGOs. Why? 
<Internals\\transcripts\\KC> - § 1 reference coded [5.08% Coverage] 
So it might be through media or through funding some civil society or advocacy 
programmes or what but I actually believe that to some extent they do play 
some roles in terms of the management of conflicts and also the resolution part. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\AM> - § 1 reference coded [1.56% Coverage] 
It’s so difficult to actually say whether they influence or not but  any individual 
appreciating that the British government has DFID and UKAID which is in 
Zimbabwe, then it means surely there should be some form of influence which 
they have in that capacity as major funders in Zimbabwe’s development 
activities. <Internals\\transcripts\\EM> - § 1 reference coded [3.13% Coverage] 
Donors in Zimbabwe for the past 5 years have been DFID which is British 
funded. So like we are saying, these local organizations partner with DFID on 
different projects they implement. Otherwise they do not have clout as to what 
they should prioritize. <Internals\\transcripts\\GM> - § 1 reference coded [2.42% 
Coverage] 
Maybe indirectly through funding some of the local institutions or local NGOs. 
So it will be on the economic front again. They may be funding institutions 
responsible with bringing conflict resolution to effect. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\HZ> - § 1 reference coded [2.29% Coverage] 
For example, we have an organization that actually spruits from Britain, 
OXFAM. It comes from the British government and we have many other 
bilateral agreements between the British and Zimbabwe government that are 
meant to positively impact on the development of Zimbabwe which in my 
understanding deals with conflict in its all phenomena. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\SM> - § 1 reference coded [2.06% Coverage] 
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Britain tries by all means to push some NGOs here in Zimbabwe whenever 
there is a conflict so that I it will get relevant in most cases, Britain seem to be 
standing for the rights of the people. They claim to be there for the people of 
Zimbabwe in terms of their rights. <Internals\\transcripts\\TC> - § 1 reference 
coded [3.44% Coverage] 
For this funding, there is a general feeling that, Britain is helping a lot in socio economic 
activities. DFID, UKAID and Oxfam are some of the INGOs. However, these are not 
thought as independent. The funding of opposition politics and participation in the 
imposition of sanctions made the Zimbabwean government suspicious of British 
funding. The funding of INGOs was also seen to be an extension of the British 
government.  
NGOs again might also be used as tools or extensions by the British 
government <Internals\\transcripts\\AM> - § 1 reference coded [0.53% 
Coverage] 
The relationship is poor because the agenda for which INGOs are coming for 
is treated with suspicion. <Internals\\transcripts\\EK> - § 1 reference coded 
[2.70% Coverage] 
Yes because most of the INGOs are not funded by African pockets or coffers. 
Most of them are funded from European coffers, pockets, taxpayers. So if the 
master is not in good books or relation with the former colony or say an 
Anglophone colony, they are not going to support…If they do, will shift and take 
the side with the political wind… Later on, they are funding more to with the 
human rights as if in the 80s there were no rights. <Internals\\transcripts\\GB> 
- § 3 references coded [3.65% Coverage] 
The relationship between Zimbabwe and UK has been one of conflict and 
tension since 2000. These NGOs also take a cue from their parent country. So 
the relationship has some element of tension because they are trying to 
advance the interests of the parent country. <Internals\\transcripts\\GC> - § 1 
reference coded [3.12% Coverage] 
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Definitely the relationship between the Zimbabwe and Britain is similar to that 
of Zimbabwe and INGOs. This is simply because these INGOs are mere agents 
of these foreign governments.<Internals\\transcripts\\GM> - § 1 reference 
coded [1.76% Coverage] 
I think on a state level, the relations are not good because our government is 
opposed to Britain. These relations are also similar to that of INGOs-local 
government relationship.<Internals\\transcripts\\HK> - § 1 reference coded 
[3.63% Coverage] 
somehow the element of distrust is there.<Internals\\transcripts\\HZ> - § 1 
reference coded  [0.44% Coverage] 
Like I said, international relief organizations are fronts of foreign policy of their 
countries where they originate from. So they can never 
differ.<Internals\\transcripts\\KC> - § 1 reference coded [2.11% Coverage] 
To some extent the relations are similar. The fact most NGOs trace their roots 
to Britain; they are viewed as agents of the former colonial 
powers.<Internals\\transcripts\\LM> - § 1 reference coded [2.39% Coverage] 
I think the way our relationship with our former colonial power is also linked to 
our relationship with INGOs. I think when our relationship with Britain sours, 
even our relationship with NGOs sours <Internals\\transcripts\\MP> - § 1 
reference coded [3.24% Coverage] 
Regarding INGOs, the ruling party still believes that there is a neocolonial hand. 
They believe that the INGOs that we have are neocolonial extensions; there 
are just but appendages of the former colonial powers. They feel that they are 
here to effect a regime change agenda which to a certain extent might or might 
not be true depending from which angle you would want to look at it. So the 
government believes that most INGOs are there to push the ideologies of our 
former colonizers and there is a confrontational approach that the government 
tried to use to stifle the voice of these NGOs.<Internals\\transcripts\\SM> - § 1 
reference coded [3.60% Coverage] 
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Yes. They are quite similar because the local government here in Zimbabwe is 
not separate from the central government. So the local government can’t 
INGOs which are viewed by the central government as the puppets of the 
Western governments. <Internals\\transcripts\\SN> - § 1 reference coded 
[4.34% Coverage] 
The relations are similar to that of INGO-local government relations. Britain and 
INGOs’ perceptions are still the same.<Internals\\transcripts\\TC> - § 1 
reference coded [1.53% Coverage] 
So on that one, the relationship is not that good already but it’s open and then 
with the Zimbabwean government and NGOs, some of the NGOs are funded 
by……what compromises the relationship between Zimbabwean government 
and the NGOs per se is that they are presumed to be funded by our former 
colonial government… Because of that, the government suspects that it is our 
former colonial that is trying to influence Zimbabwe using the NGOs for regime 
change issues.<Internals\\transcripts\\TD> - § 2 references coded  [3.60% 
Coverage] 
What has happened is that the government has suspected NGOs as agents. 
So they have now kind of identified them as people with an agenda that is not 
national. So there is that conflict with NGOs, yes.<Internals\\transcripts\\VM> - 
§ 1 reference coded [3.66% Coverage] 
5.6.4 INGOs' conflict driving potentials and attempts 
As shown in figure 5.22 below, generally the INGOs were viewed as active conflict 
drivers mostly due to the bias towards certain political parties and being conduits of 
western initiatives. Yes they help, but was decried that there is selective engagement 
in the provinces. The advocacy for Eurocentric values specifically homosexuality were 
largely viewed as the cause of conflict.  
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Figure 5.22 
Generally the aid that is coming from the aggressor is viewed as a source of cognitive 
dissonance in the community; 
MD: This one I am giving my personal view. I think they do contribute. From my 
personal experience, I remember our country was once colonized by Britain 
and when our government wanted to solve the land issue, land reform was done 
and we were sanctioned to the extent that things got tough in our country. But 
the same people who gave us sanctions, I am surprised to note that we receive 
some donor support from them. It’s a bit ironic. In my own perspective, I think 
they do cause. <Internals\\transcripts\\MD> - § 1 reference coded [5.85% 
Coverage] 
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Then we have USAID funding or giving food aid in Zimbabwe during the crisis 
decade in Zimbabwe.  
 CM: Which crisis? 
GB: 2000 to 2008. Many people in the rural areas were receiving food 
contingency from the USAID and other international non governmental 
organizations like Africare, and Christain Care. All those organizations were 
branded as fomenting violence in those areas by buying votes in which now in 
retrospection the ruling party leashed out its political arm to those people to 
those people who we receiving food aid. <Internals\\transcripts\\GB> - § 1 
reference coded [3.76% Coverage] 
The advocacy of Eurocentric values was also identified as a driver of conflict. Issues 
of homosexuality and western gender roles were the main cited ones;  
Yes they do. When they come here to promote a certain agenda which is said 
to be in the best interest of locals, you find that these foreign conceived 
prescriptions are not compliant with our local context, eg, the issue of 
homosexuality which was topical in the crafting of Zimbabwe constitution. We 
had a statement made by Mugabe totally dismissing such ideas and practices, 
yet we had the opposition camp that strongly agitated for such people’s 
freedom. This is an agenda which originated from the western world, a foreign 
import causing some conflict among locals. <Internals\\transcripts\\GM> - § 2 
references coded [5.51% Coverage] 
These NGOs when they set up in Zimbabwe bring new philosophies and ideas 
to the people. For example on the issue of homosexuality, there are some 
NGOs coming from country where they legalise homosexuality. They brought 
some influence to an extent such that some are now fighting for a right to be 
gay. Such is foreign to Zimbabwe.<Internals\\transcripts\\TC> - § 2 references 
coded [4.21% Coverage] 
I think they do contribute. I will give a very simple example; in Zimbabwe we 
have our own African cultures that we do have and we have these many other 
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organizations that are coming in to preach the gospel of human rights which to 
my understanding is a conception that arose from a Eurocentric 
perspective…Now you tell a father in Muzarabani that you are equal to your 
wife and the father is used to a patriarchal system where the father is the head 
of the house. So I think you have understood the position where I am coming 
from. We have organizations like WOZA and Musasa Project whose ideological 
underpinning actually come from the Western international organizations. I 
think from that perspective they actually cause conflict in the set up of our own 
African Relations between women and men.<Internals\\transcripts\\SM> - § 2 
references coded [4.85% Coverage] 
For some they are perceived as being in search for negative publicity in the 
international community; 
I cited the Catholic Commission of Peace and Justice. Citing a typical example 
the 1980 massacres in Matebeleland were heavily published by the Catholics 
the Jesuits and they produced actually a pamphlet on that which was widely 
circulated and distributed. This in any way is being used now by the opposition 
to cite that Zanu PF did massacres, they butchered people in Matebeleland 
thereby insinuating more sins of violence upon the discovery of such 
information because it is now considered to be in the wrong hands by the Zanu 
PF and Zanu PF is also hating the Jesuits for public information as well. So I 
think in a way they contribute to the emergence.<Internals\\transcripts\\GB> - § 
1 reference coded [4.68% Coverage] 
These NGOs are deemed to be funded from elsewhere. Obviously, there are 
seen as if trying to thwart or to sell Zimbabwe a negative publicity to 
international community. <Internals\\transcripts\\SZ> - § 1 reference coded 
[2.50% Coverage] 
For some they felt that they are involved through passive aggression as they passively 
refused to help when need arises.  
I can safely say so. If the incubate government is not dancing to their tune, 
usually they try to foster disgruntlement. In a way, they initiate sometimes. I can 
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take the Tokwe-Mkosi issue after the emergence of floods, most NGOs were 
being told help through the provincial leadership. Instead they chose to refuse. 
<Internals\\transcripts\\KC> - § 1 reference coded [4.54% Coverage] 
However for some the involvement would be unintended, they would be working for 
humane good but this may turn bad when the enlightened person stood to fight for 
their rights;  
If they do that, they may do that indirectly. Our organization, we normally hold 
workshops, we identify some problems then come up with some possible 
resolution. Maybe that possible resolution may lead to confrontation. We first 
identify those problems in the region, after identifying those problems, we give 
each other task to do. As we advocate for those resolutions, that’s when 
conflicts start.<Internals\\transcripts\\PB> - § 1 reference coded [6.14% 
Coverage] 
Well, international NGOs, their contribution in terms of conflict emergence in 
Zimbabwe though it’s not on the ground, but these organizations work with the 
public in Zimbabwe. For example, on human rights issues, the conflict that they 
may lead to emerge is that they enlighten people on what they think or what 
they view to be flaws in terms of how the government operates. At the end of 
the day, the people are mobilized to stand for their rights but in a way that is 
opposite to what the government will be expecting. In that perspective, there 
comes a conflict between the people and the government, you know, as the 
authorities having been influenced by the international organizations, which 
include Human Rights Watch in Zimbabwe, Transparency International 
Zimbabwe. They are enlightening the people and then the people will rise to 
stand for their rights maybe in ways that are not compatible to what the 
government would expect and that becomes a conflict between ht e 
government and the people but having been influenced by the international 
NGOs or maybe local NGOs.<Internals\\transcripts\\TD> - § 1 reference coded 
[8.45% Coverage] 
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As a result some of the participants refused the chances that the INGOs are involved 
as conflict drivers, rather they viewed them as more on the resolution as they 
concentrate on empowering the masses.  
I don’t think they put any seed of conflict but it’s just propaganda by those who 
accuse them.<Internals\\transcripts\\EK> - § 1 reference coded [2.51% 
Coverage] 
MP: They don’t really contribute to conflict emergence but I think they are cases 
where they are being accused to have contributed to conflict emergence by the 
politicians mostly. My understanding however is that their objective is mainly to 
make things better by solving conflicts rather than creating 
them.<Internals\\transcripts\\MP> - § 1 reference coded [5.01% Coverage] 
PB: I don’t think so, but to conflict resolution.<Internals\\transcripts\\PB> - § 1 
reference coded [0.75% Coverage] 
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5.7 RECONCILIATION WITH INGOS 
The recommended reconciliatory endeavours are summarized in the tree map below 
 
Figure 5.23 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
The key findings that emerged from the data were the participants’ conception of 
conflict, the concerns on the inadequacy of conflict resolution mechanisms, the 
management of conflict resolution mechanisms and the general consensus that 
INGOs directly and indirectly influence conflict resolution mechanisms. Participants 
differed on whether the influence was justified or not. The next Chapter discusses the 
results in relation to the aims and objectives of the study giving emerging 
recommendations. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss the findings presented in Chapter Five, making an 
interpretation of same in reference to the aims and objectives of the study. The 
discussion will then proffer recommendations that emanate from the data to conflict 
practitioners, government, NGOs and the academia. Finally, this chapter will conclude 
the study. 
6.2 DISCUSSION 
The discussion of findings focuses on the responsiveness to the aims and objectives 
of the study. 
6.3 INFLUENCE ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS 
In establishing whether international NGOs influence conflict management and 
resolution processes in Zimbabwe, the research findings discussed in the preceding 
chapter indicated that INGOs exert influence on conflict resolution mechanisms in 
Zimbabwe. The researcher came up with questions (Interview Guide Questions 4 to 
6) which sought for responses to gather data on INGOs influence on conflict resolution 
mechanisms. These responses were coded in accordance with the data produced. 
Additional data on the same was also collected from available literature. 
The research findings demonstrated that calculated intention to influence political 
outcomes featured as the most dominant drive of INGO programmes where 
humanitarian and civic education programmes were cover for hidden objectives. 
(Manji 2007, Shiviji 2005, Tandon 2001) established similar assertions in their critiques 
of NGO operations in developing countries. 
However, some of the respondents felt that it was justified for the INGOs to attempt to 
influence political outcomes in Zimbabwe as the government was prone to 
maladministration. This research was exploratory, and sought to establish key 
findings, one of which was confirmation of the existence of INGO influence on conflict 
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resolution mechanisms, the study did not go into the details of the justification 
proclaimed by some respondents. It is recommended that further studies can be done 
to go into detail of the justification of the influence. 
It was however proved that most INGO funding is mobilised by their governments to 
assist their foreign policy objectives. Thus, the benefit to Zimbabwean people that may 
occur from INGO programmes may only be incidental, and not the primary cause of 
the programme. Hence, the campaigns for socio-economic and political changes are 
liberalisation drives that may cause conflicts in Zimbabwe without improving the lives 
of the general populace. For example, some of the human rights ‘wars’ such as gay 
rights have caused a lot of conflict in Zimbabwe as they present a cultural clash. The 
conflicts of such cultural clashes arise from the fear of possible loss of identity. Burton 
(1990) identified identity as a basic human need.  
6.4 LIMITATIONS OF LOCAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
The study also sought to establish whether NGOs limit the local management options 
which were established to be inadequate for the task. Responses to the local 
adequacy of conflict management systems were found to be two fold, for the 
government, the systems were wanting as INGOs in human rights advocacy usurped 
the space whose regulations was meant for political parties resulting in conflict 
management gaps. For the NGOs, (both local and international), the local systems 
were inadequate and inefficient.  It was however noted that ‘appropriateness’ of 
conflict resolution institutions to the nature of conflict was largely behind government’s 
decision to promulgate the 2004 NGO Bill which was an attempt to curtail perceived 
western onslaught on the domestic front. 
There was a high degree of polarisation of relations between and among conflict 
resolution institutions and NGOs where the later were labelled as either “political” or 
“apolitical”. In most cases the labels were driven by perceptions and subjective 
calculations leading to a network characterized by suspicions and set for conflict. 
6.5 INTERESTS OF GOVERNMENTS OF COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN  
The research aim Number 2 sought to establish the interests of INGOs where it was 
established that the countries of origin of INGOs were using same (INGOs) as agents 
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to orchestrate their governments’ interests. Question Number 6 was designed to 
collect the relevant responses, refer to Interview Guide.  Responses to the question 
led to collection of data on Zimbabwe-America relations. The grounded theory 
approach used in this study allowed the free flow of data and led to the collection of 
data on USA even when the instrument was mainly designed for the former colonial 
power thereby generating richer data. The guide was only an assisting instrument to 
achieve the aims and objectives and not an end in itself , and as such remained flexible 
to accommodate divergence from itself that was consistent with the aims and 
objectives.  
The research thus opened up to note that during the period being studied, a decade 
after the Cold War, the USA was extending its global hegemony and the capitalist 
ideology. When the USA took sides with Britain (and EU) against Zimbabwe, the 
issues proliferated from land redistribution to liberalisation and other various human 
rights, prompting one of the respondents in this research to argue that in Zimbabwe 
human rights started in year 2000. The pronunciation of ZIDERA Act in USA in 2001 
entrenched the USA into the Zimbabwe-Britain conflict, widening the conflict base, and 
restricting the resolution gate. NGO programmes were found to be more responsive 
to donor countries interests than recipients’ needs. The EU sanctions on Zimbabwe 
also had similar effects. 
Britain lobbied USA and EU for the imposition of sanctions at governmental level and 
immediately INGO operations were affected.  INGOs adjusted their programmes to 
suit the interests of their governments as demonstrated by organisations such as 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department for 
International Development (DFID), Oxfam, Save UK, Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) among others, who withdrew funding from humanitarian 
programmes once their governments of origin, ceased harmonious relations with the 
government of Zimbabwe. 
The activities of INGOs in Zimbabwe during the period under review (200-2010) did 
not complement governmental programmes, but instead, contradicted governmental 
programmes. 
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This study has established that powerful states influence the domestic stability of 
developing nations and that NGOs can be a foreign policy tool as was the case with 
Britain or can be a tool for extending hegemony as was the case with USA (using 
ZIDERA). 
6.6 INGOS AS CONFLICT DRIVERS 
Objective Number 1 of the study was to establish the role played by NGOs in conflict 
resolution and the researcher used the interview guide to collect the relevant data. 
NGOs were established to be conflict drivers instead of being resolvers. The 
withdrawal of donations, some of which was previously channelled through 
government and the redirection towards politically motivated civic education, 
deliberately pitted the government and people on a conflict path. The issue of regime 
change featured prominently in the study where the funding of opposition parties and 
civic society to put pressure on government to effect policies favourable to western 
countries portrayed INGOs as conflict drivers. The funding of ‘safe houses’ for 
perpetrators of political violence by some INGOs promoted conflict as perpetrators felt 
encouraged by the comfort of possible failure of apprehension by law enforcement 
agents. 
The conflict emanating from the land impasse between Zimbabwe and Britain caused 
an increase in NGO activities in Zimbabwe that clashed with government’s policies 
and perspectives. INGOs openly supported opposition parties leading to polarisation 
and mistrust. Western sponsored local NGOs working on governance issues 
embarked on ‘emancipation” drives that were aimed at freeing the people from some 
form of perceived bondage. Their programmes were designed to suit the donors’ 
interests in order to attract funding. Thus, NGO activities aimed at delivering the 
donor’s mandate and did not do much in addressing the needs of the ‘beneficiaries’.  
6.7 BROADER LESSONS  
The study’s second objective was to recommend to African governments possible 
amicable future engagement of NGOs in conflict resolution processes. It was 
established that INGOs in human rights and governance advocacy operate on the 
assumption that ‘they represent the ordinary people’ for the realisation of human rights 
because same are oppressed by the government. Available literature by (Soderstrom 
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2008, Von Compe 2008, Manji 2007, Shivji 2005, Tandon 2000) has indicated that the 
drive towards liberalisation demonstrated by INGOs in their quest for ‘globalisation’ 
and emancipation of oppressed people has caused the spiral of conflicts in developing 
countries. There is a close relationship between liberalisation and NGO programmes. 
This study has revealed similar findings as democracy and human rights programmes 
conducted by INGOs either led to direct conflict between the government of Zimbabwe 
and INGOs or to sections of society against the government. 
NGO activities are more concentrated and receive more publicity in developing 
countries whose governments have differences with western governments. They also 
work with opposition parties. In Zimbabwe, the collaboration of INGOs with opposition 
parties fuelled the conflict. It is against this background that African government should 
seek for international regulations that govern the operations of INGOs to protect both 
themselves as well as their nationals. Diplomatic engagement should be pursued with 
the countries of origin in cases where INGOs fail to work with governments of 
developing nations. This study proved Tandon (2002) assertion that governments of 
countries of origin are using INGOs to pursue their foreign policy and as such, 
diplomatic engagement opens possible conflict resolution strategies.  
 Governments in Africa should work closely with NGOs to avoid suspicions and 
mistrust. In Zimbabwe, this study noted that some of the accusations were mere labels 
but they formed the basis for conflict. Social service delivery in Africa is also a 
contentious issue between governments and their nationals. There is need for 
improvement of public administration and poverty eradication as most civil society 
organisations used these as entry points to orchestrate their own interests. 
6.8 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The study makes various recommendations to government, local NGOs and civil 
society, INGOs, donors as well as for future research. 
6.8.1 Government 
The government needs to address the issues of internal maladministration which led 
a number of respondents to welcome external influence. Vices such as corruption and 
nepotism gave civil society groups the impetus and justification to work with opposition 
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parties. Having curbed administrative vices, the government also needs to deliver 
social services to the people. 
The study demonstrated that most INGOs receive direction from their governments 
and as such, any meaningful reconciliation should be done with their governments as 
local efforts only will portray the government as autocratic. Reconciliation with western 
countries will also be beneficiary to the economy as EU sanctions and ZIDERA will be 
uplifted.  
6.8.2 Local NGOs and Civil Society 
Local NGOs and civil society should separate their programmes with political issues 
to avoid clashes with government. There is need to build confidence between them 
and government and reduce polarisation and labelling. Their programmes should also 
be shaped by local realities rather than donor driven to avoid cultural and political 
conflict. 
6.8.3 INGOs 
The research demonstrated suspicions and perceptions of bad intentions by 
government in most INGOs’ programmes. The funding of ‘safe houses’ reduced 
INGOs to conflict funders. There is need for INGOs to channel funding towards 
developmental programmes and to work with governments as a means to mitigate 
conflict.  
6.8.4 Donors 
Donor programmes will be more appreciated if they fund the recipients’ interests rather 
than the donor’s interests. Thus, the donors should not impose programmes, but 
instead, design responses based on the recipients’ needs. There is also need for 
donors to complement governmental programmes and in cases where they disagree 
with the latter’s policies, withdrawal from the country would be better rather than 
lobbying for the donor’s preferences. While there is need to restore confidence 
between government and INGOs in order to create a harmonious society, this study 
has proved that reconciliation needs to occur between the government of Zimbabwe 
and those of the mother countries of the INGOs before any significant positive 
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milestones can be achieved because most of the funding is either provided or 
controlled by governments of the countries of origin of the INGOs. There is need for 
global governments to harness developmental strategies in diplomatic relations so that 
suspicions are eliminated. 
6.8.5 Future Research 
While research data pointed at inadequacies in conflict resolution systems, it did not 
establish whether the inadequacy emanated from numerical inadequacy, or from 
inefficiency of the existing institutions. Further research can seek to establish the 
efficiency, capacity, suitability and numerical adequacies of the conflict resolution 
systems. 
There is also need to establish the future of diplomacy in the face of globalisation. Is 
diplomacy and sovereignty weathering away as predicated by Azar (1991) or is it just 
power politics as contended by realists? Further studies can research on the effect of 
global dictates that are embraced by governments of developing countries; where they 
do not cause immediate conflicts. This research proved that the concept of Track Two 
Diplomacy was being overstretched to encroach into the sovereignty of states. 
6.9 CONCLUSION 
The study used grounded theory and as such, had no expectations, to prove or 
disprove any existing theory. The key findings of the research responded to the aims 
and objectives of the study giving a comprehensive exploration of the existence of 
influence imparted on the conflict resolution systems of Zimbabwe by international 
NGOs. Political interests featured as the key driver for most NGO programmes and 
the conflict. It was thus, apparent that solutions to the conflict lay more in the diplomatic 
re-engagement of the Zimbabwe government and the western governments than in 
domestic conflict resolution mechanisms.  
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Appendix 1: Interview Guide 
 
Name:  ………………………………………  
Date:…………….………………………….. 
 
Section A- Understanding of Conflict                      
1. What do you understand by the terms conflict and conflict resolution? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
2. Are conflicts in Zimbabwe being resolved or managed adequately by local 
authorities and institutions? (please explain) 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
3. In your own opinion, does Zimbabwe have adequate conflict resolution 
institutions? Why do you say so? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
4. Is there any influence on Zimbabwe’s conflict resolution institutions from 
international Non- Governmental Organisations that operate in the country? 
(please explain) 
..…………………………………………………………………………………………
..…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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5. If there is external influence through international NGOs, is the influence 
political, economic, social or else? (please explain) 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
6. Does Zimbabwe’s former colonial power (Britain) exert any influence on 
conflict resolution efforts in Zimbabwe? (please explain) 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Section B –Non- Governmental Organisations’ efforts 
7. Do international NGOs contribute in any way to conflict emergence in 
Zimbabwe? (if so, how?) 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
8. How would you describe relations between international NGOs and the local 
conflict management institutions and systems? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
9. How would you describe Zimbabwe’s relations with its former colonial power? 
Are the relations similar to that of the international NGO-local government 
relationship? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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10. Is there a conflict between the Zimbabwe government and international NGOs 
that work on political and governance issues in the country? If so, how can the 
government of Zimbabwe reconcile the conflict with international NGOs? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix 2: Informed Consent Form 
NELSON MANDELA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
Participant’s full name: ________________________________________________ 
ID or passport number, physical address and email address:  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
I was invited to participate in the below-mentioned research project undertaken by 
Mavis Matsanga, an MPhil candidate in Politics and Governmental Studies at the 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University in Port Elizabeth, South Africa. 
Title of the research project:  
 
An Exploration of the Influence of International Non- Governmental 
Organisations on Zimbabwe’s Conflict Management Systems 
Principal investigator: Mavis MatsangaAddress: 17 Parndon Rd Sunridge, P.O. 
Mabelreign, Harare.Phone: +263772620770 
The following aspects of the study have been explained to me, the participant: 
Appendix 3: Aims and objectives of the research project  
 
Aims and objectives 
4) Establish whether NGOs influence conflict management and resolution processes 
in Zimbabwe.  
5) Establish whether the NGOs orchestrate the interests of the governments of their 
countries of origin.  
6) Establish whether NGOs limit local conflict management options in Zimbabwe. 
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Procedures:   
I understand that the investigator will use semi-structured interviews and 
questionnaires to gather information on conflict resolution in Zimbabwe, South Africa 
and DRC.  
The data gathered will be used for the MPhil treatise. 
Possible risks: 
The principal investigator has advised me not to reveal any sensitive information that 
can put me in jeopardy after the research is made public. 
Possible benefits: 
- Better understanding of the field of conflict resolution;  
- Contribution to the academic debate about the conflict resolution;  
- Offering recommendations to improve current conflict resolution practices in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Confidentiality:   
My identity will not be revealed in any discussion, description or scientific publications 
by the investigators. 
Access to findings: 
An electronic copy of the findings will be available on the NMMU website and a printed 
copy will be in the NMMU library.  
My participation is voluntary and my decision whether or not to participate will 
in no way affect my present or future career/employment/lifestyle.  
The information above was explained to me (the participant) by Mavis Matsanga in the 
English language and I am in command of this language. I was given the opportunity 
to ask questions and all questions were answered satisfactorily. 
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No pressure was exerted on me to consent to participation and I understand that I may 
withdraw at any stage without penalization. Participation in this study will not result in 
any additional cost to me. 
I HEREBY VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ABOVE-
MENTIONED PROJECT. 
 
Signed in ______________________   Date ______________________ 
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Mavis Matsanga 
MPhil Candidate in Politics and Governmental Studies 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University 
Port Elizabeth, South Africa 
 
Date: 25 June 2013 
 
My name is Mavis Matsanga. I am from Zimbabwe and I am an MPhil candidate in the 
Department of Politics and Governmental Studies at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University (NMMU) in Port Elizabeth, South Africa. 
I am currently working on a research study that explores the influence of international 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) on Zimbabwe’s capacity to resolve 
conflicts. My aim is to explore the available conflict resolution mechanisms in the 
country assessing their adequacy in the face of influence from international NGOs.  
Apart from an extensive literature review, I plan to conduct in-depth interviews with 
international experts, practitioners and local actors in some of the countries in the 
region. 
This study is supervised by Mr. Savo Heleta from the Department of Development 
Studies at NMMU. The ethical integrity of the study has been approved by the 
Research Ethics Committee of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University. 
I would appreciate if you could participate in this study and answer my questions about   
the nature of the conflicts in Zimbabwe, paying particular attention to the political, 
economic and social mechanisms in the country that deal with conflict resolution, the 
involvement of international NGOs that may be impinging on the country’s capacity to 
resolve conflict or any other topic that impacts on conflict resolution in Zimbabwe. The 
interview will be semi-structured and the participants will have an opportunity to bring 
up issues they think are important and are not covered in my questions. It will be based 
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on informed consent and conducted on a voluntary basis. The participants will be able 
to refuse to answer any questions and leave the process at any time. 
To participate in the study, the participants will have to sign a written consent that they 
understand and agree to the conditions. Although the identity of participants will at all 
times remain confidential, the results of the research study may be presented at 
conferences, published in specialist publications and communicated to the media, 
international organizations and academic community. 
Thank you in advance for your time and consideration! 
Sincerely, 
 
Mavis Matsanga 
matsangam@gmail.com 
+263772620770 
 
Name of participant _____________________    
Signature _____________________________ 
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Appendix 4: Language Editing  
